U.S. Army 235 Years Young -- Still Going “Army Strong.”

In the spring of 1775, this “army” was about to confront British troops near Boston, Massachusetts. The revolutionaries had to re-organize their forces quickly if they were to stand a chance against Britain’s seasoned professionals. Recognizing the need to enlist the support of all of the American seaboard colonies, the Massachusetts Provincial Congress appealed to the Second Continental Congress in Philadelphia to assume authority for the New England army. Reportedly, at John Adams’ request, Congress voted to “adopt” the Boston troops on June 14, although there is no written record of this decision. Also on this day, Congress resolved to form a committee “to bring in a draft of rules and regulations for the government of the Army,” and voted $2,000,000 to support the forces around Boston, and those at New York City. Moreover, Congress authorized the formation of ten companies of expert riflemen from Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia, which were directed to march to Boston to support the New England militia. These were the first troops Congress agreed to pay from its own funds, and later became the 1st Continental Regiment.

From 235 Army Birtrthday page.


A milestone of note.

Last Serving Vietnam War Soldier Retires


After 40 years of Army service dating back to the Vietnam War, Gen. Charles C. "Hondo" Campbell, commander of U.S. Army Forces Command, will retire here, during a combined retirement/change of command ceremony June 3.

"The Army of today is a fundamentally different from the Army of 2001," Campbell said. "We have adapted for the present and the future fight. We have moved from a division structure to a brigade-centric modular structure, from a linear force generation model to a rotational force generation model that is characterized by progressive readiness and cyclical deployment, and from a National Guard and Army Reserve that was a strategic force to one that is fully integrated into the operational force and are (now) making proportional contributions every day," he said.

For more inforation see
U.S. Army Home Page
The Center for Military History


BE ALL YOU CAN BE

Afganistan:Looking at the Surge

Now that President Obama has make His decision to surge* in Afganistan, it is a good time to look at what we can expect. Our forces and those of are allies are streched thin with little in country reserves. It seems there will be a major Taliban offensive come spring, if they don't launch one we will. The surge should provide the troops to deal with it, and counter attack. Personally I think 30,000 (four maybe five regimental/brigade combat teams with support troops) is to few but that is as much as will be available to move by spring. More will certainly need to follow especially to take advantage of what develops by summer. The enemy has no way to develop his actions to Mao Zetung’s mobile phase where they could win a purely military victory. Without doing that they will lose unless the we get tired or lose patience and withdraw. They will try to deny us access to the civilian population and ware down our will to fight and hope they can cause enough hurt that the President will cut his losses in August 2011. The fighting will be in Afghanistan the real war will be in for the hearts and minds of the American political establishment.
[* I do not really like using the word "surge" here. The surge in Iraq was in response to a specific operational situation, Afganistan is a very different and less tractable opertional situation. THis could produce false expectations.]


Some good articles on what to expect.

From General Crystal’s assessment supporting the request for 40,000 additional troops.

The situation in Afghanistan is serious; neither success nor failure can be taken for granted. Although considerable effort and sacrifice have resulted in some progress, many indicators suggest the overall situation is deteriorating. We face not only a resilient and growing insurgency; there is also a crisis of confidence among Afghans -- in both their government and the international community - that undermines our credibility and emboldens the insurgents. Further, a perception that our resolve is uncertain makes Afghans reluctant to align with us against the insurgents.
Success is achievable, but it will not be attained simply by trying harder or "doubling down" on the previous strategy. Additional resources are required, but focusing on force or resource requirements misses the point entirely. The key take away from this assessment is the urgent need for a significant change to our strategy and the way that we think and operate.

snip

This is a different kind of fight. We must conduct classic counterinsurgency operations in an environment that is uniquely complex. Three regional insurgencies have intersected with a dynamic blend of local power struggles in a country damaged by 30 years of conflict. This makes for a situation that defies simple solutions or quick fixes. Success demands a comprehensive counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign.
Our strategy cannot be focused on seizing terrain or destroying insurgent forces; our objective must be the population. In the struggle to gain the support ofthe people, every action we take must enable this effort. The population also represents a powerful actor that can and must be leveraged in this complex system. Gaining their support will require a better understanding of the people's choices and needs. However, progress is hindered by the dual threat of a resilient insurgency and a crisis of confidence in the government and the international coalition. To win their support, we must protect the people from both of these threats.



Strategy Page is gives it’s description of the plan approved by President Obama.

American commanders believe the 30,000 additional U.S. troops, plus increases in Afghan and NATO forces, will enable the Taliban to be crushed within a year. But after that, Afghanistan will require economic and military assistance for at least twenty years, to bring sustained peace to the country. The plan is to turn over security to the central government within five years. Initially, through the middle of next year, there will be more violence. The Taliban and drug gangs will not go gently into the night. They will resist energetically, many choosing to fight to the death.

It continues with a background and assessment.



Michael Yon describes what he thinks will be one of the critical battles around Kandahar. I think this is good assessment of the opertaional problems, what will happen and what needs to be made to happen.

People are confused about the war. The situation is difficult to resolve even for those who are here. For most of us, the conflict remains out of focus, lacking reference of almost any sort.

Thus he begins an overview of the strategic/operational situation in Afghanistan. I doubt you will find a better analysis.

The most we can do is pay attention, study hard, and try to bring something into focus that is always rolling, yawing, and seemingly changing course randomly, in more dimensions than even astronauts must consider. All while gauging dozens of factors, such as Afghan Opinion, Coalition Will, Enemy Will and Capacity, Resources, Regional Actors (and, of course, the Thoroughly Unexpected). Nobody will ever understand all these dynamic factors and track them at once and through time. That’s the bad news.

The good news is that a tiger doesn’t need to completely understand the jungle to survive, navigate, and then dominate. It is not necessary to know every anthropological and historical nuance of the people here. If that were the case, our Coalition of over forty nations would not exist. More important is to realize that they are humans like us. They get hungry, happy, sad, and angry; they make friends and enemies (to the Nth degree); they are neither supermen nor vermin. They’re just people.

Snip

President Obama and NATO will plan to send tens of thousands more troops. The big fight shaping up will likely unfold in the south, in places like Helmand, Kandahar, and to a much lesser extent, Zabul, and also in other eastern provinces. We could use far more troops, and so other places will be left to fester, but the surge and change of course might be enough to turn the war around. We will find out.

Russians say we repeat their mistakes but they are wrong. The Soviets employed true scorched-earth tactics—the same tactics that many armchair commanders at home would like to employ. Every time the Soviets whacked the Afghan hive, more hornets raged out. Soviets bullied their way around places like Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and were fantastically brutal in Afghanistan, using all the fire they could breathe. Their “Rules of Engagement,” if any, were probably more concerned with conserving ammunition. They tortured.

Soviet abuses enflamed the population and combat ranged from north to south—with much occurring in Kandahar Province, the capital of which is Kandahar City. The Soviets fought in places like Bamian, where today Americans can literally go on vacation. The Lithuanian Ambassador to Afghanistan told me he took some holidays in Bamian and loved it. Last year, I drove about a thousand miles from Jalalabad to Kabul to Mazar-i-Sharif and back, and other places, with no problems and no soldiers. Most of the country is not at war. Much of this is a result of our strict “Rules of Engagement” (ROE) which seems to be driving people crazy at home (and many soldiers, too). Many soldiers hate these new ROE, and there is little doubt that we will lose troops due to restrictive ROE. My own thoughts are of little relevance.

He describes the Green zone, the river valleys that have vegetation compared to the vast surrounding desert. This is where the people live and is what must be controlled.

The Green Zone to the right [in his Earth Google shot] is caused by the Arghandab River, just next to Kandahar. The Taliban want Kandahar and are in a good position to get it. The year 2010 likely will mark a true Battle for Kandahar, though it probably will not be punctuated by the sort of pitched battles we saw in places like Mosul and Baghdad. This remains unknown.

Armies from at least three countries have ventured into the Arghandab River Valley: British, followed by Soviets, and more recently Canadians; all were unsuccessful.

Snip

Since the 2001 invasion, U.S. soldiers have come and gone from the Arghandab, but we’ve never had enough soldiers to sit still. More recently, the Canadians made jabs at Arghandab but did not get far. Some people believe the Canadians have been militarily defeated in their battlespace. No US officer has told me that the Canadians have been defeated, and none have denied it. There is no doubt that Canadian troops earned much respect, and that more than 130 paid the ultimate price.

On current course, Canada will have fully retreated by 2011. This is crucial: the enemy realizes that our greatest weakness is Coalition cohesion and they have defeated what was an important partner.

Now it’s mostly down to the U.S. and Afghan forces to saddle Arghandab, or lose Kandahar and if Kandahar probably the war.

A sobering analysis. On the positive side with enough troops and time a positive engagement strategy winning is possible. On the negative side lack of resources, impatience, or allowing frustration and anger to develop into excessive force, can bring defeat.

Read the whole article. I think it will provide a good filter to to view news reports of military action over the next year or so.
HT: Instapundit


For a lower level look at what the battle will be like see his report on embedding with the 2d Battalion of the British Rifle Regiment which seems to be too small of a unit for it’s mission.


Another key part of the battle will be carrying the war to the enemy which will mostly be Special Operations action. The London Telegraph gives a sanitized summary of what will happen.

It will be a tough year.

See also

Maothought or Who is Winning

Obama Says Bomb ’em
Les Solidat Americain dan Afganistan
East Meets West - President Obama in the Middle East
Mr President - Make a Decision
It's Now Obama's War

All my Afganistan posts.

Book Review: The Drillmaster of Valley Forge

In June 1778 George Washington’s Continental Army tried to destroy the rear of the British Army near Monmouth NJ. An indecisive battle of little note except for the first time Washington’s Continentals met British Regulars; held their own and gave as good as they got. What caused the transition of the Continentals from semi-disciplined amateurs to a trained army able to fight on the regular’s terms?






The Drillmaster of Valley Forge: The Baron de Steuben and the Making of the American Army

Paul Douglas Lockhart

Publisher: Collins (September 9, 2008)







Frederich Wilhelm Ludolf Gerard Agustin von Steuben was born on September 30th 1730, among the godfathers for whom he was named was King Frederich William I of Prussia, with his permission. His father was an engineer in the Prussian Army a holder of the Pour le Merit a soldier of great reputation and no wealth. Steuben joined the Prussian army at fourteen and followed the usual steps of a regimental officers career for ten years until the Seven Years War. He distinguished himself as a regimental officer, in an elite light infantry battalion, and then in a number of staff positions from brigade to the Army Staff. Near the end of the war Frederick the Great selected him for advanced training. But at the end of the war, despite being known as an up and coming officer he was discharged for reasons that are not entirely clear. He was employed as the Court Chamberlain of the minor German State of Hohenzollern-Hechingen until his efforts to find military employment let him the American side in the Revolution. While Chamberlain he was awarded the title the Frieheer, loosely equivalent to a British knighthood, but translated into French as Baron. Thus he was Baron de Steuben. But not “Baron von Steuben” which would represent a very different position.

Benjamin Franklin got him an appointment to the Continental Army. Washington appointed de Steuben as Inspector General with the rank of Major General. At that time this position was more similar to a G-3, operations, than the ombudsman and administrative inspector of the modern army. The biggest problem at the time was the Army had no consistent method of training drill or discipline. Each regiment followed the drill of the commanders drill book (there were several in publication) and this was done to varying levels of commitment and success. His solution was to form a model company to teach a basic drill then send it’s members back to their units to act as instructors. He established a through inspection program to see that it was done. He cut quite a figure, riding through camp with the pomp of a Prussian General and major nobility, on the drill field, personally demonstrating and correcting, swearing like a trooper, and always, when inspecting putting the welfare of the soldiers on the same basis as drill. In three months, even after the devastating winter of 1777/78 the Continentals were a disciplined and trained army with confidence in there own abilities.

That spring of 1778 the British retreated from Philadelphia to New York by land, Washington set off to intercept him, knowing he could not defeat the larger force he planned to cut off and defeat the rear of the British column. The lead of the attack was entrusted (by seniority and politics) to General Horatio Gates whose poor planning and execution caused the attack to stall then he ordered the army to retreat. However with there new found confidence and training individual regiments held together as disciplined units, they knew they hadn’t been defeated and wanted to fight. Washington came up, rallied the Army and turned the retreat into a defense and then counter attacked. Something the Continental Army could not have done a few months earlier. De Steuben commanded the reconnaissance forces for the Army and provided Washington with excellent intelligence on where the British were and what they were doing. He also played a key role in turning the retreat around.

After this he continued to serve as Inspector General, made a number of reforms, and served as a temporary field commander when Washington needed someone with special abilities. An outsider with no alliance to the many factions he could accomplish this where other officers would have had their efforts lost to politics. But this also denied him an assignment to a major command. He wrote the Army’s first Drill Manual which remained in effect until 1812, while the tactical parts are long outdated, the section on leadership is still good guidance.

In 1780 de Steuben was appointed second in command for Nathaniel Green’s campaign to recapture the southern colonies. Green left de Steuben in Virginia to organize a base, forward supplies and recruits, and then follow Green. However, the British landed an army in Virginia, under Benedict Arnold, giving him the responsibility to defend Virginia with the forces at hand. Not quite the way de Steuben wanted it, he had his major command. This campaign is often cited as criticism of his actual battlefield generalship as opposed to his drill field leadership. Lockhart makes a good case that de Steuben did as well as anybody could in the circumstances and better than most, though his lack of tact in dealing with local politicians hurt his efforts. With an army of changing and occasional militia, a battalion of newly recruited continentals, hardly better trained than the militia, never totaling more than a fraction of the enemy, he prevented the British from capturing Virginia or using it to support the Southern Campaign. Notably, he fought two successful delaying actions against larger forces, saving his army and critical war stocks.



There are many controversies about the veracity of De Steuben’s credentials. Lockhart establishes the he was in fact a member of the minor nobility at birth and entitled to use von Steuben. This brought him no land or income but gave him the social status to be commissioned in the Prussian Army. Baron de Steuben certainly did not discourage people from thinking “baron” was the equivalent of a British Barony. Foreign officers had by this time, a poor reputation in the Continental Congress. Benjamin Franklin and Silas Dean, the American representatives in Paris, decided that de Steuben with experience and abilities beyond his status a former captain in the Prussian Army, needed to have his credentials enhanced, reporting him as owner of massive estates and a former Lieutenant General in the Prussian Army. This was apparently not his doing, though he went along with it, and quietly let on after he was accepted as a Major General in the American army that this was inflated. Also de Steuben was prone to be ambiguous inexact and expansive in personal correspondence leaving the impression of much greater position than he had.

De Stueben's personal life was a shambles, he could not manage his personal finances, popular but with no intimate friends, charming or tactless, loyal to a fault but never letting go of a grudge. His reputation is clouded by rumors of all sorts, which if true, no primary evidence survives. As a soldier brilliant, a failure at every thing else. But it was the mess of his personal life that led him to serve in the American cause, a man with badly needed talents and abilities. Truly he helped make the American Army.



A good book for readers of all levels of interest. The authors explanations of the how and why of de Steuben’s reforms is good background for any reading on 18th Century warfare. Interesting illustrations and adequate small scale maps, some large scale maps of individual battles would be nice. Strongly Recommended.




Related: The Year of the Hangman, George Washington’s Campaign Against the Iroquois

Happy Birthday US Army

Today is the 234th Birthday of the United States Army.


The United States Army Ceremonial Drill Team performing at the Edinburgh Military Tatoo.


Be all you can be!

The US Military - An Outside View

Dawn is a Pakistani news service. They recently posted an article by Kamran Shafi on his observations on the American Armed Forces. and the implications for the Pakistani Armed Forces.

I have been to Fort Myer in Virginia with my chum and course-mate Zafar Kayani who was married to Colonel Jo Ann Kayani, now sadly passed on, good and gracious woman. Jo Ann was commander of Headquarters Company, US Army, stationed at Fort Myer and it was my pleasure to visit not only her spartan office but also the canteen where officers ate alongside privates, carrying their own trays and standing in line waiting their turn. Fort Myer serves the Washington D.C. military district and the senior-most officers serving in the Pentagon live there. I have had the pleasure of seeing Gen Colin Powell, then chief of the joint staff, mow his own lawn in one of a row of houses that housed him and other senior generals including the chief of the army staff. The houses were in typically American suburban style: no walls, with sloping lawns running onto the pavements.

Most of all, I was astonished to see that there was no wedding hall anywhere in Fort Myer. Neither was there was any burger joint catering to all comers in any of the officers messes, and none of the mess buildings had bank branches and wedding dress boutiques in them. The US army had not constructed shops all around the fort either, and its soldiers did not sell pastries and bread. I saw no evidence of banks and travel agencies and textile mills and sugar factories and cornflakes-manufacturing mills and estate agencies being run by the US army (or the US navy and the US air force for that matter) in my travels across America. Armed forces stations were just that: armed forces stations with limited access to civilians, and those too who were accompanied by a member of the armed forces or their dependent(s). Neither, and this is important, does the US army run farming operations and get into disputes with the tenant farmers who till the land as share-croppers.

Since one mostly drives in the US to get from point A to B, many were the times that I came upon army convoys on the highways. Every single time the convoy travelled in the slow lane, at the designated speed, the drivers with both hands on the steering wheels, headgear on, looking straight ahead. No slouching, no cigarette hanging from the drooping lower lip Humphrey Bogart style. In the back, if there were soldiers being transported, they sat up straight, headgear on, no slouching, no smoking. And no leering at passing cars either!


Of course, with a closer view I saw the warts he missed, but his comments are appreciated. What he is talking about is an attitude in and out of the military; that is not dependent on this or that defense policy option, this or that weapons system, or budget level. Whatever is done with defense policy maintaining this attitude is vital.

--------------------------------------------------

Read the article, his comments on the current fighting in the Swat and Bruner areas is a different but worthwhile perspective than is given in the American news media.


HT: Pragmatic Euphony who provides a look from an Indian point of view.

Presidents Day 2009 - The Gettysburg Address.

In July 1863 the Union and Confederate Armies engaged each other at Gettysburg Pennsylvania in the decisive battle of the war. (See Book Reviews: Gettysburg for background.) On November 19, 1863 President Lincoln delivered a short address at the dedication of cemetery for those who had fallen. Reportedly the address, following a two hour oration by the main speaker, was hardly noticed by the crowd. But the short length of the Gettysburg Address put it on the front page of every paper in the North and it’s simple eloquence placed it in the heart and memory of the country.

Lincoln’s words are a still a strong reminder of the ideals on which the country was founded and a call to rededicate ourselves to these ideals.




Performed by Jeff Daniels.

Book Review: The Echo of Battle

“Armies always prepare to fight the last war.” The Army is accused of preparing for the Cold War/World War III and then fighting an insurgency in Iraq. The Army is now as prepared, as it ever will be, to fight the war in Iraq. In two years (or hopefully less) this will be the last war. The Army is again ready to fight the last war –Iraq. But in reality we could end up in any of several types of war, and as the 3d Infantry Division found in Baghdad, the type can change overnight. Since the M-2 Crystal Ball is hopelessly stuck in development, how does the US Army determine what the next war will be like, and prepare for it?

Book Review: The Echo of Battle: The Army's Way of War
Brian McAllister Linn
Harvard University Press





Brian McAllister Linn’s latest book looks at the question of how the Army thinks about preparing for the next war. He identifies three intellectual traditions in the Army with very different ideas on the nature of war, and what will be needed, and how to prepare for it. During peacetime when they look at past wars they see different things that contributed to success or failure, and advocate different virtues approaches and solutions. The Army’s preparations for the next war are based on the interplay of these traditions. All of them have made major contributions and all of them have been the source of significant problems. Officers of each tradition have been excellent commanders and notable failures. When each tradition listens to the lessons past wars and draws conclusions it is influenced by it’s values, thus it hears only The Echo of Battle it expects.

These different traditions have dominated at different times. These are tendencies; individual officers may have ideas that are from two or even all three schools. No tradition has ever been so suppressed that in need it could not reassert itself. Each will propose it’s own explanations for success and failure. The success or (more often) failure of these traditions to interact with each other and larger events provide the intellectual framework how the Army prepares to fight the next war.




The Guardian sees war as in exercise of Science.

War can be reduced to a Science and correct action is deduced. Basically an engineering project, apply the right formulas and win. Victories are explained as the result of good doctrine and equipment, a defeat means there was some defect the doctrine or equipment, a reason for more study of the science of war in the future. The political assumptions of the Guardians are that the world is a cruel and brutal place and war could be imposed on us with no notice. It is usually associated with the assumption that US military policy is defensive, offensive action at the national level is not taken except in response to other countries actions or to defend vital national interests. The 19th century Coast Defenses are the classic example of their influance. Small wars are side shows which divert resources. The purpose of the Army is to deter war more than fight a war. This assumes very little diplomatic or political involvement; some one attacks and we defeat them and let the diplomats sort it out later.

At it’s best it places good equipment in the hands of the troops with good tactical/operational doctrine to use it. At it’s worst, when war is not deterred, it does not have a National Military Strategy to implement the doctrine and equipment it provides.


The Manager sees war as an activity to be Managed.

It sees modern war as the mobilization of societies fielding large armies to win a war for national survival, or a crusade for some great goal. War requires careful planning for the organization and mobilization of society to create a mass army. The use of standardized programs and equipment is the only way to manage these large forces. It tends to de-emphasize human factors. WWII, which was a manager’s war in many respects, is the war where American soldiers started calling themselves GI’s (Government Issue.) The invasion of Northwest Europe in WWII is it's greatest sucess. When a war occurs it dominates all aspects of society. During a war political activity is subordinated to the great goal. Again this assumes very little political or diplomatic involvement and then at the service of the war effort, after the victory the diplomats will work out (dictate) the peace.

At it’s best it enables the deployment of large forces to fight major enemies and ensures that the troops in the field are the best-supplied army in the world. At it’s worst it promotes bureaucratic stagnation, and overlooks the fighting of small wars.


The Hero sees war as a Human endeavor.

People fight wars, thus the traditional military virtues of courage, character, and loyalty are essential to any successful operation. While the Guardians and Managers are engineering and managing for the next war, the Heroes were the line soldiers who fought Indians, pacified the Philippines, chased Poncho Villa, and made the surge in Baghdad. They fought the in front line of all the major wars. They know that a war cannot be considered won if you just win the battle; there has to be a political solution. They also know that without a military victory you cannot get a political solution. They are inclined to value the moral over the material, sometimes to the disregard of modern technology. Their endeavors fall apart for ad hoc design and poor management.

At their best they provide decisive battle leadership and an ability to adapt to whatever they find. At the worst they are the officers in the 1930’s who believed the élan of a cavalry charge could defeat machine guns.




Linn’s concept places a different perspective on debates about preparing for war. Each tradition is not monolithic and can have different viewpoints within it. For example Linn says that the famous Air Corp-Coast Artillery debates were within the Guardian tradition.Debates are often between traditions not old and new, or old and new in a tradition without much reference to others. What may seem to be progressive original “out of the box” thinking may actually be a very conservative exposition of a different tradition.

Of course when a war comes the Army meets a very hardheaded reality, and none of the traditions sees this reality as a whole, thus the Army is often not prepared to fight that war. If the Army is to be prepared to fight the next war, or adapt to the war it finds, rather than what it has prepared for, all three traditions need to be in serious discussion with each other.



Analysis and Opinion

Linn’s concepts bring to mind Russell Weigliey’s The American Way of War a History of the United States Military Strategy and Policy. He builds on Weigliey’s work providing significant new understanding.

Weigliey’s major theme was that when circumstances allow the American Way of War is to seek out and destroy the enemies armed forces and/or ability to wage war. Attrition and indirect strategies are only adopted out of necessity. When the enemies ability to wage war is destroyed the situation is turned over to the politicians and diplomats for a political solution. Both Linn’s Guardian and Manager traditions are different ideas on how to do this. Even the Hero tradition, which sees the need for the political solution sees a military solution as perquisite.

Another of Weigley’s themes was the dichotomy of a Regular Army that thinks it’s mission is to fight European type armies, the most difficult and dangerous opposition, and directs most it’s intellectual effort is how to fight them - but spent most of it’s history as a frontier and later colonial constabulary fighting indians and guerillas, the most common mission. In Linn we see that contrast in greater detail. While their documentary history is not as clear, Linn shows that the Heroes represent a constant intellectual tradition in how to prepare and fight wars, which has made a major contribution to the Army. Weigley writing from the Manager tradition tends to see them as outside the intellectual tradition of the Army.


One thing that struck me was how often the “datum” that was missed by all three traditions in planning for the next war was the future decisions of our political leadership. One of the best examples Linn sites is Lieutenant General John Schofield, then a former General in Chief of the Army saying that “foreign conquest and permanent occupation are not a part of the policy of this country” and just over a year later the US declared war on Spain. Since this was not a policy of the country there was no need to prepare the Army for it. In stating this I think Schofield was not only stating his strong personal and professional values but the prevailing consensus in the country. He would most likely have been pilloried if he had said “foreign conquest and permanent occupation are a part of the policy of this country” To a greater or lesser degree the possible conflicts envisioned by our political leadership, and which the Army was directed to prepare for, were not the ones that developed. But then if the political leadership had envisioned them they may have prevented them.

While Linn limits the topic to the Army’s internal debates, these traditions seem, especially since WWII, to reflect the similar views of the broader defense community and to US perceptions on warfare generally. The traditions exist (and perhaps others) across the Defense Department and broader defense community. Except for breaking discussions into manageable portions I am not sure the Army’s intellectual discussions can be still treated independently of the larger Defense discussion. For example, he sees the Wineberger/Powell Doctrine of fighting only for essential national interests, with popular support, in quick overwhelming decisive campaigns as an expression of the Guardian tradition. But the Rumsfeld “transformation” is also an expression of the Guardian tradition. The difference being the Wineberger/Powell envisioned a key role, in conjunction with the other services, for the Army (a role with which the Army was comfortable, perhaps too comfortable); but Rumsfeld’s vision gave the impression that the eventually the Army would be relegated to base guards and target spotters. This may help explain why the Army did not get along well with Secretary Rumsfeld. I get the impression that pre-9/11 the Army was only a marginal, and perhaps unwelcome, participant in much of the discussions that led to the “transformation” policy. It is not enough that the Army's three traditions are in discussion with each other but they must also be in a serious discussion with their counter parts in the larger Defense community, to ensure the oppertunities and problems of ground combat are taken into account, and the Army receives instructions to prepare for a future war that has a basis in reality.



The Army prior to 9/11 was not prepared to fight the Cold War/World III, as the accusation I began this post claims, it was prepared to execute the Wineberger/Powell doctrine, the last coherent political direction it received. This was useful for “major combat operations" in Iraq: but was not what was needed or the “minor combat operations” that followed. The Runsfeld transformation doctrine weakened the march to Baghdad and except for providing good air support weapons was not much use for fighting the insurgency. Of course an insurgency is a “Hero’s war."




Summary

Best quote from the book. Linn quotes General Tommy Franks saying; “I’m a warfighter, not a manager”. In the footnote he comments “Franks is quite correct in his assessment of his managerial abilities”

This is a well written book that should be mandatory reading for Army officers and any one with a strong interest in military policy. For those who would only read two or three books on the subject The Echo of Battle should be one of them. STRONGLY RECCOMENDED,


Brian McAllister Linn is a History professor at Texas A&M University and the author of U.S.Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War 1899-1902, The Philippine War, Guardians of Empire, The U.S. Army in the Pacific 1902-1940 All of which are excellent. The Philippine War is an example of how military history should be written.


See Also

Reviews of Parameter articles.
Military Culture Wars
War Termination


Other
How Not to Fix the Military

N.B. The pictures other than book cover are US governemnt art and in the public domain.

See Also

Carriers in the West Pacific
How Not to Fix the Military

Black History Month: "We're ready, Colonel!"

On 18 July 1863 the Fifty Fourth Massachusetts (more) led an assault on Fort Wagner, one of the Forts guarding Charleston Harbor. One of the first African American regiments it’s bravery at Fort Wagner helped win a place for eventually over a hundred African American regiments during the Civil War. It fought until the end of the war, and it’s colors are now carried by the Honor Guard of the Massachusetts National Guard.

From the movie Glory.






Update 24 feb 2008. The first video with the title Were Ready Colonel was pulled by You Tube "terms of use" violation by it's creator, so I took it off the post.
Update 27 May 2009. The video is back.

Soldiers are People, Too.

Marge Fenelon at Catholic Exchange " . . .had a good dose of reality the other night. I went to a Family Readiness Briefing with our oldest son, Matt. His brigade is being deployed soon and so the National Guard arranged a meeting to inform and support the soldiers and families as they prepare.

As I looked around the auditorium, I saw the faces of young men and women, parents, wives, children and siblings. I saw families, couples, and singles. I saw…people. Real, live people. "


Read the Article

Le Soldat Américain dans Afganistan

From a French soldier serving as a liaison with the US Army in Afghanistan:


“We have shared our daily life with two US units for quite a while - they are the first and fourth companies of a prestigious infantry battalion whose name I will withhold for the sake of military secrecy. To the common man it is a unit just like any other. But we live with them and got to know them, and we henceforth know that we have the honor to live with one of the most renowned units of the US Army - one that the movies brought to the public as series showing “ordinary soldiers thrust into extraordinary events”. Who are they, those soldiers from abroad, how is their daily life, and what support do they bring to the men of our OMLT every day ? Few of them belong to the Easy Company, the one the TV series focuses on. This one nowadays is named Echo Company, and it has become the support company.
They have a terribly strong American accent - from our point of view the language they speak is not even English. How many times did I have to write down what I wanted to say rather than waste precious minutes trying various pronunciations of a seemingly common word? Whatever state they are from, no two accents are alike and they even admit that in some crisis situations they have difficulties understanding each other.
Heavily built, fed at the earliest age with Gatorade, proteins and creatine - they are all heads and shoulders taller than us and their muscles remind us of Rambo. Our frames are amusingly skinny to them - we are wimps, even the strongest of us - and because of that they often mistake us for Afghans.
Here we discover America as it is often depicted : their values are taken to their paroxysm, often amplified by promiscuity and the loneliness of this outpost in the middle of that Afghan valley. Honor, motherland - everything here reminds of that : the American flag floating in the wind above the outpost, just like the one on the post parcels. Even if recruits often originate from the hearth of American cities and gang territory, no one here has any goal other than to hold high and proud the star spangled banner. Each man knows he can count on the support of a whole people who provides them through the mail all that an American could miss in such a remote front-line location : books, chewing gums, razorblades, Gatorade, toothpaste etc. in such way that every man is aware of how much the American people backs him in his difficult mission. And that is a first shock to our preconceptions : the American soldier is no individualist. The team, the group, the combat team are the focus of all his attention.
And they are impressive warriors ! We have not come across bad ones, as strange at it may seem to you when you know how critical French people can be. Even if some of them are a bit on the heavy side, all of them provide us everyday with lessons in infantry know-how. Beyond the wearing of a combat kit that never seem to discomfort them (helmet strap, helmet, combat goggles, rifles etc.) the long hours of watch at the outpost never seem to annoy them in the slightest. On the one square meter wooden tower above the perimeter wall they stand the five consecutive hours in full battle rattle and night vision goggles on top, their sight unmoving in the directions of likely danger. No distractions, no pauses, they are like statues nights and days. At night, all movements are performed in the dark - only a handful of subdued red lights indicate the occasional presence of a soldier on the move. Same with the vehicles whose lights are covered - everything happens in pitch dark even filling the fuel tanks with the Japy pump.
And combat ? If you have seen Rambo you have seen it all - always coming to the rescue when one of our teams gets in trouble, and always in the shortest delay. That is one of their tricks : they switch from T-shirt and sandals to combat ready in three minutes. Arriving in contact with the ennemy, the way they fight is simple and disconcerting : they just charge ! They disembark and assault in stride, they bomb first and ask questions later - which cuts any pussyfooting short.
We seldom hear any harsh word, and from 5 AM onwards the camp chores are performed in beautiful order and always with excellent spirit. A passing American helicopter stops near a stranded vehicle just to check that everything is alright; an American combat team will rush to support ours before even knowing how dangerous the mission is - from what we have been given to witness, the American soldier is a beautiful and worthy heir to those who liberated France and Europe.
To those who bestow us with the honor of sharing their combat outposts and who everyday give proof of their military excellence, to those who pay the daily tribute of America’s army’s deployment on Afghan soil, to those we owned this article, ourselves hoping that we will always remain worthy of them and to always continue hearing them say that we are all the same band of brothers”.







Original: A NOS FRERES D’ARMES AMERICAINS
Translation: Serendipitous Altruism

HT: The Anchoress

Happy Birthday - US Army

Army Birthday Book Story

U S Army Home Page

Center for Military History

Uniforms from 1775 to present. Photo on Army Page


Be All You Can Be!

Photo and drawing credit US Army

The Iraq Situation

It has been five years since the invasion of Iraq. It has been almost a year since my last Iraq specific post. So I suppose it is time to look at the way things are going.

Back in February 2005 in An Event Table Not a Timetable I commented on the many calls for a “Timetable” to withdraw from Iraq:

Some are calling for the Administration to publish a timetable for withdrawal from Iraq. The Administration is politely declining to do so.


And so why not?

Any timetable assumes that specific events will happen before any point on the timetable. If the table is published all those who disagree, especially the insurgents, can plan their activities to ensure that the required events cannot happen on time. Even if militarily insignificant every failure to meet the table is a political and psychological defeat. All guerrilla wars are highly influenced by political and psychological factors. Announcing a timetable is a set up for embarrassment at least.


But doesn’t there have to be some sort of basis for planning?

Well yes, but a published timetable is not it. The proper way is to have a table of the desired events. This would underlie a timetable any way, but if the events move forward or backward, or are out of sequence we are not trapped by an artificial artifact.


And going out on a limb I pointed out one of the big events.

This week’s dead tree version [of the Army Times} carries the headline. “Your ‘Ticket Out of Iraq’ - 15,000 troops whose tours were extended are coming home – How fast can the Iraqi soldiers take over for the rest?” There is a four-page spread on different units and experiences in training Iraqi units. The Iraqi units involved are paired with US units. The message is clear “’get these guys trained!’ so we can come home and stay there.”

So how is this going? The Iraqi troops in the articles were “not up to US Army standards” but getting better. The US trainers had good relationships with the Iraqi’s and were confident in their success. The best overall source is from Global Security here and here. It appears that progress is being made - slowly.

And a quote from General Petraeus I had forgotten about “. . . I want to get the hell out of here."


It is symptomatic of the handling of the Defense Department that sending trainers to train the new Iraqi Army did not happen until close to 18 months after the collapse of the old Iraqi Army and the capture of Baghdad.

I spent most of my military time in training units, staffs and schools. Training an Army from the the ground up is a massive job, during a war is not the ideal time and place, even so it has taken longer than I expected.


In July 2007 I ranted about possibility of a A March UpCountry? included an overview of the situation:

The original insurgency of pro-Saddam Baathists has been effectively defeated since the end of 2005. Of course like all insurgencies some idiots will be throwing bombs for years, but it is really an Iraqi police problem at this point. Al Quida is on the run, its policy of trying to get Iraqi support by killing Iraqis, only got Iraqis mad. They may be more than a strict police problem at this point, but AQ is not likely to overthrow an Iraqi government of any type. Since about the beginning of 2006 a number of armed groups that had been sitting out the original insurrengency decided it was time to use force to get a better bargaining position for the final settlement, maybe even settle old scores, and get rid of some competitors. This is a very different dynamic than previously, which could be analyzed in the framework of standard guerilla warfare. Now we have groups that purport to represent major portions of Iraqi society, though if they weren’t armed and willing to kill people it is doubtful how much support they would have. When commentators in the last year or so have been worried that Iraq was slipping into a civil war they are expressing a concern that these groups may be able to pull whole sections of Iraqi society in to combat with other sections. Some of these groups have better outside forign connections than the Baathists which is why we are seeing more foreign (especially Iranian) weapons and other support than the Baathists received

The role of military action is limited but critical. They have to keep all the non-government factions from getting into a military position where they can dictate their terms, hurt them enough that a peaceful settlement will get them more than they have the ability to take by force. This has to be done without alienating the larger groups the militants claim to represent. Basically this is protecting the Iraqi Governments efforts to reach a peaceful settlement. The war will not be won by a straight military victory in the field, but also it can’t be done without military operations. The war can be lost militarily.


Now the the Long War Journal in [the] Iraqi Army presses into Sadr City tells us that

The Iraqi Army said three of its brigades were involved in the operation, and moved into Sadr City in seven convoys. Six of the nine available battalions from the three brigades were pushed into Sadr City. Between 4,000 and 5,000 Iraqi troops are now operating inside Sadr City.
The US military, including the advisory teams, has not entered the northern areas of Sadr City. "No U.S. troops have gone beyond Quds Street," said Lieutenant Colonel Steven Stover, the chief Public Affairs Officer for Multinational Division Baghdad, in an e-mail to The Long War Journal. "This is an Iraqi planned, led, and executed operation. US soldiers are providing advice, intelligence and enabling support."

This is an operation the size of the attack on Fullajah in November 2004. That the Iraqi's are able to launch it pretty much on their own is compelling evidence of a major training success for the Iraqi Army. It was the failure of a similar Iraqi only operation in December 2005-January 2006 that set the events in place that led to the surge. That operation failed because they did not have enough strength and too many of the units were not up to the opposition they faced. With the success of the Iraqi dominated operation in Basra recently it seems that the Iraqi Army has achieved a decent level of maturity.

The Long War Journal adds:

Sadr and his political movement have become increasingly isolated since the fighting began in Basrah, Baghdad, and the South. The Iraqi government, with the support of the political parties, said the Sadrist political movement would not be able to participate in upcoming provincial elections if it failed to disband the Mahdi Army. On April 13, the cabinet approved legislation that prevents political parties with militias from contesting provincial elections this year. The bill is now in parliament for approval. Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani, the top Shiite cleric in Iraq, said the Mahdi Army was not above the law and should be disarmed. Sadr has refused to disband the Mahdi Army.

Militarily, as noted above the original Baathist insurgency is defeated. Al Quida in Iraq is pretty much confined to the Mosul area and fighting to survive. Most of the Sunni groups have sought a separate peace with the Iraqi Government, and the Sadr forces are the last major Shia holdouts.



Some events that are late by any time table that would have been made in 2005, but real none the less.

Since you can click on my links and see how many predictions I got wrong, I’m not going to make any more.



My Iraq topic posts.

How Not to Fix the Military

Fred Kaplan and Phil Carter have published ten recommendations in Slate on "How to Fix the Military". I am not overly impressed. It is the same old tired boilerplate that has been around for years, better at finding problems than analyzing them or recommending good solutions.

I suppose my biggest gripe comes from having been employeed as a systems analyst. They are looking at symptoms announcing generic solutions for the symptoms. Of course when the underlying problem is not addressed fixing the symptom is not effective. One of the reasons these sorts of recommendations often go nowhere is that people recognize they are not likely to be effective even if they do not see the actual problem.

Several of their recommendations are directly related to the Iraq War and being prepared to conduct similar wars in the future. Iraq will soon (all fingers tightly crossed) be the last war. At least they did not include the bromide that the military always prepares to fight the last war. Since the M-2 Crystal ball is stuck in development we have to expect that the next war could be any of several types of war, including one like Iraq. Their proposals seem to be for organizing to fight small insurrections, police actions, and campaigns against second rate powers. While that is a real possibility it is not a certainty and I am not certain that these would be the most likely possibilities or the most dangerous threats to the US.





They recommend overhauling the Budget. A good idea. The budget is Congresses. Most of these problems come from the way the Congress likes to manage the budget, which may or may not be a good way to mange civilian agencies. They consider several ideas that might be good ideas if the Congress will approve them but provide no rational as to why the Congress would consider them a good way to manage defense policy. A lot of the overlapping items they comment on are the type of thing that the Congress likes because ovewrlaping forces agencies to go back to the Congress for resolution. A major improvement here has to start with a commitment by Congress to a different way of doing business.


They say there needs to be a “bottom up” review of the defense budget. This is bad systems analysis. The review should be “top down.” To be fair it sounds like they are calling a “top down” review a “bottom up” review. A real “bottom up” overhaul is just the thing to perpetrate the problems they are commenting on.

A top down solution starts with what do we want/expect/need the military to do to be militarily effective in accomplishing national policy Then for each successive level down analyze against that standard.

A bottom up approach looks at all the neet technology (or what factories are in what congressional districts), that is the bottom, and tries to figure out how to build up from that. This sort of approach produces results that are often described as resembling a bowl of spaghetti. This is the method behind former Secretary Rumsfeld’s “transformation” policies. Realistically any review will contain some of both thus someone will get to republish the boiler plate in a few years. Hopefully we will have enough “top down” to get something that works, and enough “bottom up” to gets the votes in Congress to pass it.


A good example comes from the their discussion of the F-22 fighter.

Our whole military war fightning ability depends on maintaining air superiority. Something the US forces have held since 1943 or 1944, so long that we take it for granted.

The F22 fighter is an air superiority fighter. The current F-15 and the F-22 are what will maintain air superiority against any challenge for the near future. A number of foriegn Air Forces are developing fighters that can compete against the F-15. and the F-22 is the standard against which they are developing new planes. Even if what they develop cannont beat the F-22 it will be able to beat the ageing F-15's. A few years ago the Indian Air force bested F-15’s in war games (admittedly under rules proposed by the Indian Air Force.)

A top down approach asks “How do we maintain air superiority in the short term and long term? Is the F-22 the way to do it?” There is a lot of discussion on the issue by people who know a lot more about the question than I do. I suspect the result will be the F-22 as a mid-term solution because the F-15's are getting too old, and some sort of unmanned aircraft (which should be less expensive) for the long run which can't be developed in time for the mid-term. There are other recommendations that address the problem.

The authors are looking at it from the bottom up, F-22’s are expensive and are not much use in street fighting in Baghdad, which is about as bottom as you can get. They comment that one reason the Air Force likes the F-22 is it provides planes for pilots to fly, which is true, but irrelevant to deciding how to maintain air superiority. But with out control of the air, Baghdad would be a very different battle and a future battle may not be winnable.



They have several suggestions that are related to the military personnel systems. They have some good ideas. Some of there suggestions are platitudes. The military personnel system is a complex interrelated labyrinth. It has good features. It has bad features. In many cases the bad feature is a side product of the good feature. You can’t fix the bad feature without possibly hurting the good feature. The system comes from decisions made starting in the 1920’s and especially after WWII. I think a good look at it is necessary, but a change with a hope to be effective will have to be a root and branch change, not the modest changes they are proposing, and which may only bring a new set of equally difficult problems.



One of the things the next adminsitration will have to do is a major look at long term defense policies and programs. These authors have done better in the past. This is not helpful.


HT: Diodotus of Elected Swineherd who has a recommendation that is always cogent.

Update May 10, 2011
See Also
Carriers in the West Pacific
Book Review: Echof Battle

La Charge Heroique

This clip from UTube is entitled La Charge Heroique. I now my French is rusty but how did Editions Mont Parrnasse get that out of “She wore a Yellow Ribbon”?

But this is too much fun not to post. Click and enjoy.

Book Review: Mapping the Civil War

Book Review:
Mapping the Civil War: Featuring Rare Maps from the Library of Congress
Authors: Christopher Nelson, Brian Pohanka, Library of Congress Geography and Map Division
Publisher: Fulcrum Publishing, 1992



This book is part of the Library of Congress Classics series. In addition to reproductions of civil war maps, it has contempory sketches and photos, a good narrative history of the Civil War, and some short but detailed essays on the maps used and mapping during the different campaigns.

The narrative history is excellent for giving the novice student of the civil war an overview of the main course of the war. The pictures give a very realistic feel of what the war was like with out being overpowering.

Of course the maps are the interesting things. There are reproductions of maps from all theaters, levels of organization, uses, and quality. They provide a full panorama of the maps used in the Civil War. It is one thing to know in theory that they did not plan a campaign using EarthGoogle. Instead they had maps that were drawn on a very small scale, had roads and key features missing or not correctly located, to plan the movement of very large forces. That the armies often literally did not know where they were, explains much of confusion of the war especially early in the war.



This is a map of the river in front of Vicksburg MS. (It is the lead map on the in the chapter on the Vicksburg Campaign.) The union gunboats and barges running this stretch of the river under fire from the town bluffs is one of the great sagas of the war. But usually there is not a map or it only shows the river in front of the town not the full hairpin turn. Here you see the tricky navigation that was carried out at night along a course where there could be no surprise.


What I found especially interesting were the excellent large scale maps of fortifications, positions and battles that show considerable skill in producing a map when time and surveying resources were available. Individual units or officers, rather than the Topographic Corp, drew many of these maps. This is a skill that is vanishing since much better can be done with computers and aerial photography.

At the beginning of the war the US was mapped in a rather haphazard manner. Collecting maps, drawing new ones, reproducing, and distributing them was a major challenge for both sides. As the war progressed each side developed a better “data base” of areas in which they operated. Reproduction facilities and efficient distribution methods were set up. When it was decided that an army was going to move from point A to B relevant maps were prepared, reproduced and distributed in a few days and available before the movement began. With its greater industrial capacity the Union did better than the confederacy but the confederacy made significant improvements. The best use was General Sherman’s Atlanta Campaign where one map was developed from the best intelligence that could be had, and every one who needed a map was using the same map. There were actually orders issued like “defend by the letter ‘O' in word 'Mountain'” a sign of high quality maps that had the trust of the users. The topographic staff was part of General Thomas’s Army of the Cumberland, which did most of the logistics work for this campaign.

Maps were prepared by the US Coastal Survey and Army's Topographic Corps, most Topographic Corps' officers stayed with the Union at the beginning of the war. Many volunteer officers who had surveying or drawing skills served on both sides. The best of them was Jedediah Hotchkiss, the principal of a small school before the war, who was Lee’s mapmaker. In the Washington-Richmond theater the Confederates almost always had better maps do to his efforts. When the Union captured his maps the Union reproduced and distributed them. There was an injustice to the officers of the Topographic Crops, they were so valuable in that role they would not be released to command regiments brigades and divisions, with the appropriate promotions that many Regular Army officers in other branches recived. None the less they performed excellently thought out the war.

The only problem with this book is that many of the maps are not reproduced on a scale that allows you to use the actual maps used by the armies to follow the action.

This is an excellent book assessable to all levels, well written with good pictures and maps. I would say that for a person is only going to read one book on the Civil War this is a good candidate. If you are person who likes maps this is a gold mine.

"Those are regulars, by God!"

June 14th is the US Army's Twohundred and Thirtysecond Birthday




Chippewa, Upper Canada, 5 July 1814. The British commander watched the advancing American line contemptuously, for its men wore the rough gray coats issued those untrained levies he had easily whipped before. As the ranks advanced steadily through murderous grapeshot he realized his mistake: "Those are regulars, by God!" It was Winfield Scott's brigade of infantry, drilled through the previous winter into a crack outfit. It drove the British from the battlefield; better still, after two years of seemingly endless failures, it renewed the American soldier's faith in himself. Center for Military History

While the Battle of Chippewa is notable as one of the few battles the US won in that misbegotten war, it was not of major tactical or strategic importance. But the endorsement from an army that had just defeated Napoleon's forces in the Spain and Portugal and would soon defeat Napoleon himself at Waterloo has echoed through the Army's history. Not just a frontier constabulary, but an Army that could stand with best.





Be All You Can Be

Call Out the Posse - The Posse Comitatus Act in the 21st Century.

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Remember in the old Westerns; the sheriff at some point would need to chase a band of outlaws. To get enough deputies he would call out the posse. He would call on some town’s folk and swear them in as deputies and off they would go, and after suitable drama and a gunfight the outlaws would be dead or in jail. It’s a great plot device but it has its origin in reality. Posse comitatus is a part of the legal heritage we received from England. Until the development of professional police forces it was main means available to local law enforcement if a situation called for more manpower than the sheriff and limited number of full or part time deputies.

Since professional police forces handle law enforcement we now only hear the word posse used reference to the Posse Comitatus Act, the speaker saying the Army can’t be used for law enforcement. In view of the recent events surrounding Hurricane Katrina, and border enforcement for both drugs and immigration I think it is time for a review.


Origin

The term posse comitatus, literally translated as the “power of the county”, first appeared in English law in 1411 with the passage of a riot act calling for the sheriffs and justice of the peace together with the “poair de counte” to arrest rioters(13 Hen. 4, c.7 (1411)).” (ref 1)

Basically the Sheriff could call upon any available citizens to put down riots. This has some prior precedent in the practice of a “Hue and Cry” in English common law where able-bodied persons was obligated to help those being attacked by criminals if the victim cried for help. In England posse comitatus was generally separated from militia and the Army, it was an act of the civil government.

Posse comitatus came to the colonies with British settlement. In most places the Sheriff would call ordinary citizens as a posse. As it developed in the colonies the sheriff would call upon the available military force, the militia, to act as a posse comitatus. Colonial governors used regular forces when there were some in the colony as a posse comitatus. They would do this because using the militia or regulars brought with it organization, training, and equipment that would not be present by calling individuals. The Constitution calls for the Militia to be called out “to enforce laws.” When this happened the Militia had it’s police power as a posse comitatus. This was almost always an act of the state government. After several questions and disputes the Attorney General in 1854 ruled that a US Marshal could call on an Army unit in his jurisdiction as a posse comitatus. He could do could this without the consent or knowledge of the unit’s superiors or Washington. If the US Marshal needed to use a posse comitatus there would not be time to contact Washington. Since the Army was very small the opportunities to do this were minimal.

After the Civil war the Army was sent to the South to support reconstruction, and in the West the Army had a larger presence than before the war. It was determined that the local Sheriff could also call on the Army as a posse comitatus. The Army was often used as a posse comitatus and sometimes the local authorities abused the power. Because of the abuses Congress passed the Posse Comitatus Act, which prohibited law enforcement officers from using the Army as a posse comitatus. It did not prohibit the use of the Army for law enforcement; it placed the decision and responsibility to use the Army as a posse comitatus squarely on the shoulders of the President. (In 1956 the Air force was added.)


The Law

The text as amended is rather direct.

Use of Army and Air Force as posse comitatus

Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.
TITLE 18 PART I CHAPTER 67 § 1385.

Title 18 is the federal criminal code. The person who is violating the law is a civilian official, who calls on and Army or Air Force unit as a posse comitatus with out clear authority of law. As the President is the Commander in Chief he is person who is authorized. No one else can except on clear delegation. The President can only make the decision in expressly authorized situations. The point of the law was to keep other officials from calling out the Army or Air Force as a posse comitatus and regulate the use, not to prevent the use of the Army and Air Force as a posse comitatus.

Title 10, governing the armed forces has a similar provision.

Restriction on direct participation by military personnel

The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe such regulations as may be necessary to ensure that any activity (including the provision of any equipment or facility or the assignment or detail of any personnel) under this chapter does not include or permit direct participation by a member of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps in a search, seizure, arrest, or other similar activity unless participation in such activity by such member is otherwise authorized by law.
TITLE 18 PART I CHAPTER 67 § 1385.


DOD uses the Title 10 text to extend the Posse Comitatus Act restrictions to the Navy and Marine Corp, and to place restrictions on the use of military assistance for law enforcement tighter than is required by the Posse Comitatus Act (Title18).


Using the armed forces a posse comitatus?

The Army and Air Force cannot be used except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress for Law enforcement. What are the "circumstances expressly authorized"?

The most obvious circumstance is not really an exception. The National Guard, when called out as a state militia, is not covered, but then it is operating as a state militia, not as a part of the Army. The call out of the National Guard for hurricane Katrina was as State Militia. This was the result of an interstate compact which is relatively new and which I discussed here

Another non-circumstance is the Stafford Act. This law governs federal support to states in a natural disaster. It is sometimes confused with posse comitatus because it authorizes the use of the armed forces. The law is very specific that it is not including federal support to local law enforcement.

The biggest “circumstance expressly authorized” is the Insurrection Act.

§ 331. Federal aid for State governments
Whenever there is an insurrections in any State against its government, the President may, upon the request of its legislature or of its governor if the legislature cannot be convened, call into Federal service such of the militia of the other States, in the number requested by that State, and use such of the armed forces, as he considers necessary to suppress the insurrection.
§ 332. Use of militia and armed forces to enforce Federal authority
Whenever the President considers that unlawful obstructions, combinations, or assemblages, or rebellion against the authority of the United States, make it impracticable to enforce the laws of the United States in any State or Territory by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, he may call into Federal service such of the militia of any State, and use such of the armed forces, as he considers necessary to enforce those laws or to suppress the rebellion.
§ 333. Interference with State and Federal law
The President, by using the militia or the armed forces, or both, or by any other means, shall take such measures as he considers necessary to suppress, in a State, any insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy, if it—
(1) so hinders the execution of the laws of that State, and of the United States within the State, that any part or class of its people is deprived of a right, privilege, immunity, or protection named in the Constitution and secured by law, and the constituted authorities of that State are unable, fail, or refuse to protect that right, privilege, or immunity, or to give that protection; or
(2) opposes or obstructs the execution of the laws of the United States or impedes the course of justice under those laws.
In any situation covered by clause (1), the State shall be considered to have denied the equal protection of the laws secured by the Constitution.
§ 334. Proclamation to disperse
Whenever the President considers it necessary to use the militia or the armed forces under this chapter, he shall, by proclamation, immediately order the insurgents to disperse and retire peaceably to their abodes within a limited time.
Title 10, Subtitle A, Part 1, Chapter 15

This Act is clearly for handling special situations. Insurrections, enforce Federal authority when it is “impracticable to enforce the laws . . . by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings”, or there is interference with the enforcement of Federal or state laws. The President has to issue a special proclamation. It is not an ordinary means of law enforcement.

Section 1 of #333 is directly concerned with 14th Amendment enforcement, and was the basis for President Eisenhower’s actions in Little Rock, Arkansas, in 1958, The rest of the Insurrection Act limits the presidents authority to enforcing Federal Law or acting on requests from State governments. This section allows the President to act without a request from the state government if there is 14th amendment issue. Other than this the Presidents authority is limited to enforcing federal laws or acting at the request of the state. The Little Rock incident of 1958 is often cited in question of why the President can’t use the Armed Forces restore order or enforce the law without a request from the state government, the answer being there usually isn’t a 14th amendment issue. During Hurricane Katrina it would have been illegal for the President to use the armed forces for law enforcement with out a request form the state except on federal property.

The biggest new exception has been laws allowing the use of the Armed forces in border drug operations. This has proved quite controversial because many do not see it as a proper use of the armed forces and others see it a logical extension of Armed forces or a way to provide this service without spending any extra money on law enforcement agencies. This has also created problems because of differences in police and military culture and procedures.

The armed forces can be used to support law enforcement actions without violating the posse comitatus Act if it does not search, seize or arrest anyone or anything. The provision of this type of support is common.

There are a number of minor exceptions, that allow military police to act a police on military reservations, and preventing the Posse Comitatus Act from baring Armed Forces members from testifying in court and similar technicalities.




Analysis

There are several problems/objections to the use of the military for law enforcement.

- The use of military force for ordinary law enforcement is repugnant to the idea of a democracy.

- It can provide a screen behind which political leaders can hide when enforcing unpopular policies. “The military did it, it’s not my fault.” ignoring that they requested the action. It was this type of abuse in the Reconstruction South that led to passing the Posse Comitatus Act.

- It blurs the distinction between ordinary situations and emergencies.

- It is common knee jerk reaction to problem to say, “Call out National Guard” without asking if that is appropriate to the situation, There needs to be a much more aggressive program of informing state and local officials of their roles, the law, the options available in an emergency. I know is this done, but some of the statements by officials after Hurricane Katrina especially in the outlying towns and parishes indicate these officials had no idea what they were talking about.

- The gradual increase in federal jurisdiction since the New Deal has greatly increased the issues where #’s 332 and 333 of the Insurrection Act could apply even if the states do not request assistance. While the expansion of Federal authority is often questioned, it is happening. It carries with it the possibility of the using the Armed Forces as a posse comitatus to enforce unpopular polices.

- While the skill sets needed for law enforcement and military action overlap there is in fact a difference. A military unit that concentrates on law enforcement will not be spending enough time on military activities to ensure it can go to war on short notice. If it concentrates on combat training it is not training for law enforcement. In the case of National Guard and Reserve units, they normally receive 38 days of training a year. Giving them an additional law enforcement mission is a major reduction of the time available for training for their military mission. For example,  National Guard units supporting the Border Patrol for annual training takes away 14 days while on the border and most of the rest of their training time will be spent preparing for this mission, taking the unit off line for it’s military mission.




Opinion

If it were my say, I would strengthen the Posse Comitatus Act, and related legislation, to limit non-emergency support and to require independent approval such as judicial warrent similar to a search warrent.

The use of police forces that have the appropriate training, equipment, and organizational culture for law enforcement actions is always best option.

If a federal law is so unpopular that the armed forces are needed for ordinary enforcement Congress should reexamine the utility of the law.

There is a very clear authorty in Federal Law (Title 42 Chapter 111) to provide law enforcement support to State and Local authorties. In most situations where one might consider military assistance to local governent there are civilian police agencies that are probally better qualified. The orginal reason for using the military as a posse comitatus is frequently supercedeed by better options.



Update: July 9th 2010

During the Katrina Hurricane aftermath the President was severely criticized for not using the Armed Forces for law enforcement when the state of Louisiana had not requested the support as required by the constitution and Insurrection Act. In 2006 this was amended to give the President this authority. The amendment was widely objected to and repealed in 2007. If it had stood this would have been a major breech in the federal nature of the Constitution.




References

1. The Posse Comitatus Act: A Resource Guide

2. Rand Corp - OVERVIEW OF THE POSSE COMITATUS ACT HTML link

3. Journal of Homeland Security commentary

4. Liberation from lawyers

5. Legal Aspects of Domestic Employment of the Army


Related Posts

The Unorganized Militia

The Unorganizd Militia II

Katrina - National Guard Assitance

Book Reviews: Gettysburg

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Killer Angels
Michael Sharaa
Ballantine Books




Courage On Little Round Top
Thomas Eishen
Skyward Publishing
Web page
Buy autographed copy from Author
Photo Gallery
Classroom Lesson Plans



NOTE: 08/15/2007. Mr Eishen reorganized and expanded his home page and the picture links no longer link. Start with his web page above.


The Battle of Gettysburg in the Civil War, along with the Battle of Vicksburg
in the west, was the one of decisive battles of that war and a watershed event of American History. These two novels look at Gettysburg from different perspectives and together tell the story, not just of an epic event in our history, but also of the soldiers “who so gallantly gave their lives.”

Michael Sharaa’s Killer Angles is Pulitzer prize winning novel, telling the story of the leaders, mostly southern, who brought the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia into Pennsylvania in the hope of ending the war, as well as two of union officers who played key roles in defeating the South and preserving the Union. We see the thinking and emotions that went in to the battle decisions. The story of an army which in many ways allowed the sense of honor and pride that was a defining characteristic get in the way of it’s goal of victory. We see the big picture of the battle from when the armies first meeting engagement and the efforts of both armies to get good positions, the efforts of Longstreet’s Corp. to turn the Unions left flank on the second day, and Lee’s last attempt to destroy the union army, in the gallant and futile attack remembered as Pickett’s charge.

Thomas Eishen’s Courage on Little Round Top is the story of two regiments, the 20th Maine and the 15th Alabama that fought in one of the battles most important engagements on the south slope of Little Round Top hill on the second day of the battle. This is story of several hundred men on each side, on a four-year hiking expedition and camping trip, interspaced with interludes of pure violence. At the end of the fight the commander of the 20th Maine came to capture a Confederate Lieutenant at sword point. These two solidiers are followed through the events leading up to the battle and the battle itself.

Colonel Joshua Chamberlain is a university professor appointed as a volunteer officer, appalled at the loss of life and at the same time enthralled at the excitement of battle and the scope for personal accomplishment he could never have in a classroom.

Lieutenant Robert Wicker was collage student who enlisted and was commissioned from the ranks. Apparently suffering from some sort of clinical depression, he is fighting his own personal demons. I gather he was a person who would never be happy in an army, he was superceded for promotion and command of his company by an outside officer, but none the less tries to serve to the best of his ability and care for his soldiers.

While most of the details our fictional the characters are the soldiers who served, and built around actual events and authentic background gives a realistic feel for what happened to the people involved.



Items of Interest.


The situation.

The Confederate Army of Northern Virginia (ANV) had marched north into Pennsylvania. The Union Army of the Potomac (AP) went off in pursuit. They met at Gettysburg, with the Confederates coming form the north, and the Union from the South. General Robert E Lee the Confederate Commander, wanted to draw the union forces in to a decisive battle, where the defeat of the Union army would force the union to accept Confederate independence. The Union army had orders to first prevent an attack on Washington and then drive the Confederate forces out of union territory.


Tactics.

West Point taught the system of the French General Jommni, one of Napoleon's lieutenants who systematized Napoleon’s tactics. A major emphasis was the full scale attack where the attacker would overwhelm the defender in a grand assault as much by the “moral force” of the assault as by numbers and weapons. This had some validity in the Napoleonic wars, though both the British and Prussian experience suggested that the defense could defeat a grand assault. In the early 1850’s the invention of the mini-ball allowed rifled muskets to fire as fast as the old smooth bore muskets and extended the effective range of the common soldiers weapon from about 30 yards to 200 yards. This allowed for firing five or six shots at the attackers instead of one or two, with a more accurate weapon. It would take the whole war before most everyone was convinced the grand assault was a thing of the past and new tactics were developed and people trained to use them. The worst part was not that the grand attacks failed but that they came so close to succeeding it was tempting to think that just a little more would win. While we are used the modern battlefield technology changing at a rapid pace, the rifled musket was the first major change in infantry weapons in 150 years and it is not really surprising that it took a long time to realize the full meaning of this change and modify tactics, and tactical organization and training to accommodate this change. (This section is from general knowledge not the books but it makes what happened clearer.)


The Cavalry.

The main role of the cavalry was to find the enemy and report their location and keep the enemy cavalry from doing the same. The days of the heavy cavalry charge had been ended by the invention of the rifled musket a few years before. Other than that, cavalry served as mounted infantry and a raiding force. Sharaa shows how the cavalry was used and misused. General John Buford, the commander of the Union cavalry has his division following the Lee and sending reports on a regular basis. When part of the Confederate army turns toward Gettysburg he reports it, finds the best position to delay the confederates and dismounts his division to fight as infantry and delay Lee long enough for the AP to react. In contrast General J. E. B. Stuart, the commander of the confederate Cavalry, sets off on a big raiding expedition, is on the wrong side of the Union army to send reports back to Lee, who is walking blind into the Union Army except for a spy hired by General Longstreet.


Longstreets Recommendation.

General James Longstreet, the ANV’s most experienced corp commander, had become convinced that the rifled musket had made the Napoleonic grand assault a thing of the past, that tactical superiority lay with the defense. He was recommending to Lee before the campaign that the ANV move north assume a defensive position where the Union would be compelled to make a grand assault on a prepared Confederate position. The evening of July 1st he tries to convince Lee to move to their right (south) and attack around the union flank rather than make a grand assault. If possible block the union supply line and force them to retreat. He repeats the recommendation on the evening of the second. Lee does not accept the recommendation, he is not convinced that Longstreet is correct, and the prize of destroying the AOP and ending the war in a massive assault is before him. Accepting Longstreets recommendation would mean withdrawing from the current battle field without victory, which he and his army would see as an affront to the honor of the their fallen comrades, the ANV, as well as their personal honor. Longstreet is frustrated at his inability to convince people on what seems so clear to him, and the fact that as the most experienced and able Corp commander it his duty to conduct attacks he does not believe in. Much of the tension of Sharaa’s novel comes from this conflict.


Little Round Top

Lee decided that on the second of July Longstreets Corp would attack on the south end of the Union line, destroy the Union forces there and then sweep north. Despite his doubts he almost pulled it off. Major General Sickles, a political appointee who commanded the Union III Corp in front of Longstreet, decided he did not like his position because there was some high ground in front of him. He moved his Corp forward against orders to occupy this position. The first problem was that it required him to double the length of his line and he did not have the troops to defend the longer line. The other problem was he left unguarded Little Round Top the high ground that really dominated that whole section of the Union defenses. Longstreets attack was achieving some success when the Union V Corp was sent to get Sickles out of trouble. As it happened the 15th Alabama was the end regiment of the Confederate line and the 20th Maine of V Corp became the end regiment of the Union line. For a short time that day the fate of both armies depended on the contest between these two regiments. This was a soldier’s battle that was over before the high command even knew it was fought. The battle was fought on a rather steep hill, too wooded for the tactics, by regiments were worn out from a day long approach march in a hotter than usual July sun. In the end it was decided by a bayonet assault when the 20th Maine ran out of ammunition. (This is the cover picture on Eishen’s book) This is the culmination of Eishen’s book and a key event in Sharaa’s

Panoramic View of the second days battle field looking east at the Union position. The partially deforested hill in the Center right is Little Round Top. The Confederates attempted to sweep to the right. The 20th Main and 15th Alabama fought on the back side of Little Round Top.

Source Wikpedia

Picketts Charge.

Lee decided to launch a Grand Assault against the center of the AOP on July 3d. Lee believed this assault could break the Union center and destroy the AOP and force the North to recognize the confederacy. He was probably right that if they made a major breakthrough the AOP would be destroyed, the question was could it succeed? The attack again went to Longstreet to conduct, but two of the three divisions belonged to another Corp. These divisions were the least tired and had not yet been in the fighting, and it would have taken too long to swap them for Longstreet’s other divisions who continued to hold the south end of the line and rest and recoup from the fighting on the second. The main division in the attack was one of Longstreet’s commanded by General Pickett. The attack was well planned and two hundred of Pickett’s men managed to make a small break in the union line but were quickly repulsed. (This is the picture on the cover of Sharaa’s book) This is a general’s battle where the preparation and planning will decide the battle. The soldiers on both sides only need to face the front and follow orders, “not to reason why but to do or die.” And much of the ANV died. After the battle the ANV had a major reorganization because of the losses, and never attempted an attack of this type again.

Panoramic View of the third days battlefield . This is the ground over which the AVN attacked. Union positions are the ridgeline in the background.



Source Wikpedia

Maps

One of the frustrating things about military history books and novels is the publisher is often to cheap to provide maps, let alone well thought maps that make the movements of the armies and people clear. Happily these books are exceptions. The maps are well designed to show the key information, but without a lot of superfluous information. The only poor map is one in “Courage at Little Round Top” where the publisher made a map postage stamp size when it should have been several inches square.