Afganistan:Looking at the Surge

Now that President Obama has make His decision to surge* in Afganistan, it is a good time to look at what we can expect. Our forces and those of are allies are streched thin with little in country reserves. It seems there will be a major Taliban offensive come spring, if they don't launch one we will. The surge should provide the troops to deal with it, and counter attack. Personally I think 30,000 (four maybe five regimental/brigade combat teams with support troops) is to few but that is as much as will be available to move by spring. More will certainly need to follow especially to take advantage of what develops by summer. The enemy has no way to develop his actions to Mao Zetung’s mobile phase where they could win a purely military victory. Without doing that they will lose unless the we get tired or lose patience and withdraw. They will try to deny us access to the civilian population and ware down our will to fight and hope they can cause enough hurt that the President will cut his losses in August 2011. The fighting will be in Afghanistan the real war will be in for the hearts and minds of the American political establishment.
[* I do not really like using the word "surge" here. The surge in Iraq was in response to a specific operational situation, Afganistan is a very different and less tractable opertional situation. THis could produce false expectations.]


Some good articles on what to expect.

From General Crystal’s assessment supporting the request for 40,000 additional troops.

The situation in Afghanistan is serious; neither success nor failure can be taken for granted. Although considerable effort and sacrifice have resulted in some progress, many indicators suggest the overall situation is deteriorating. We face not only a resilient and growing insurgency; there is also a crisis of confidence among Afghans -- in both their government and the international community - that undermines our credibility and emboldens the insurgents. Further, a perception that our resolve is uncertain makes Afghans reluctant to align with us against the insurgents.
Success is achievable, but it will not be attained simply by trying harder or "doubling down" on the previous strategy. Additional resources are required, but focusing on force or resource requirements misses the point entirely. The key take away from this assessment is the urgent need for a significant change to our strategy and the way that we think and operate.

snip

This is a different kind of fight. We must conduct classic counterinsurgency operations in an environment that is uniquely complex. Three regional insurgencies have intersected with a dynamic blend of local power struggles in a country damaged by 30 years of conflict. This makes for a situation that defies simple solutions or quick fixes. Success demands a comprehensive counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign.
Our strategy cannot be focused on seizing terrain or destroying insurgent forces; our objective must be the population. In the struggle to gain the support ofthe people, every action we take must enable this effort. The population also represents a powerful actor that can and must be leveraged in this complex system. Gaining their support will require a better understanding of the people's choices and needs. However, progress is hindered by the dual threat of a resilient insurgency and a crisis of confidence in the government and the international coalition. To win their support, we must protect the people from both of these threats.



Strategy Page is gives it’s description of the plan approved by President Obama.

American commanders believe the 30,000 additional U.S. troops, plus increases in Afghan and NATO forces, will enable the Taliban to be crushed within a year. But after that, Afghanistan will require economic and military assistance for at least twenty years, to bring sustained peace to the country. The plan is to turn over security to the central government within five years. Initially, through the middle of next year, there will be more violence. The Taliban and drug gangs will not go gently into the night. They will resist energetically, many choosing to fight to the death.

It continues with a background and assessment.



Michael Yon describes what he thinks will be one of the critical battles around Kandahar. I think this is good assessment of the opertaional problems, what will happen and what needs to be made to happen.

People are confused about the war. The situation is difficult to resolve even for those who are here. For most of us, the conflict remains out of focus, lacking reference of almost any sort.

Thus he begins an overview of the strategic/operational situation in Afghanistan. I doubt you will find a better analysis.

The most we can do is pay attention, study hard, and try to bring something into focus that is always rolling, yawing, and seemingly changing course randomly, in more dimensions than even astronauts must consider. All while gauging dozens of factors, such as Afghan Opinion, Coalition Will, Enemy Will and Capacity, Resources, Regional Actors (and, of course, the Thoroughly Unexpected). Nobody will ever understand all these dynamic factors and track them at once and through time. That’s the bad news.

The good news is that a tiger doesn’t need to completely understand the jungle to survive, navigate, and then dominate. It is not necessary to know every anthropological and historical nuance of the people here. If that were the case, our Coalition of over forty nations would not exist. More important is to realize that they are humans like us. They get hungry, happy, sad, and angry; they make friends and enemies (to the Nth degree); they are neither supermen nor vermin. They’re just people.

Snip

President Obama and NATO will plan to send tens of thousands more troops. The big fight shaping up will likely unfold in the south, in places like Helmand, Kandahar, and to a much lesser extent, Zabul, and also in other eastern provinces. We could use far more troops, and so other places will be left to fester, but the surge and change of course might be enough to turn the war around. We will find out.

Russians say we repeat their mistakes but they are wrong. The Soviets employed true scorched-earth tactics—the same tactics that many armchair commanders at home would like to employ. Every time the Soviets whacked the Afghan hive, more hornets raged out. Soviets bullied their way around places like Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and were fantastically brutal in Afghanistan, using all the fire they could breathe. Their “Rules of Engagement,” if any, were probably more concerned with conserving ammunition. They tortured.

Soviet abuses enflamed the population and combat ranged from north to south—with much occurring in Kandahar Province, the capital of which is Kandahar City. The Soviets fought in places like Bamian, where today Americans can literally go on vacation. The Lithuanian Ambassador to Afghanistan told me he took some holidays in Bamian and loved it. Last year, I drove about a thousand miles from Jalalabad to Kabul to Mazar-i-Sharif and back, and other places, with no problems and no soldiers. Most of the country is not at war. Much of this is a result of our strict “Rules of Engagement” (ROE) which seems to be driving people crazy at home (and many soldiers, too). Many soldiers hate these new ROE, and there is little doubt that we will lose troops due to restrictive ROE. My own thoughts are of little relevance.

He describes the Green zone, the river valleys that have vegetation compared to the vast surrounding desert. This is where the people live and is what must be controlled.

The Green Zone to the right [in his Earth Google shot] is caused by the Arghandab River, just next to Kandahar. The Taliban want Kandahar and are in a good position to get it. The year 2010 likely will mark a true Battle for Kandahar, though it probably will not be punctuated by the sort of pitched battles we saw in places like Mosul and Baghdad. This remains unknown.

Armies from at least three countries have ventured into the Arghandab River Valley: British, followed by Soviets, and more recently Canadians; all were unsuccessful.

Snip

Since the 2001 invasion, U.S. soldiers have come and gone from the Arghandab, but we’ve never had enough soldiers to sit still. More recently, the Canadians made jabs at Arghandab but did not get far. Some people believe the Canadians have been militarily defeated in their battlespace. No US officer has told me that the Canadians have been defeated, and none have denied it. There is no doubt that Canadian troops earned much respect, and that more than 130 paid the ultimate price.

On current course, Canada will have fully retreated by 2011. This is crucial: the enemy realizes that our greatest weakness is Coalition cohesion and they have defeated what was an important partner.

Now it’s mostly down to the U.S. and Afghan forces to saddle Arghandab, or lose Kandahar and if Kandahar probably the war.

A sobering analysis. On the positive side with enough troops and time a positive engagement strategy winning is possible. On the negative side lack of resources, impatience, or allowing frustration and anger to develop into excessive force, can bring defeat.

Read the whole article. I think it will provide a good filter to to view news reports of military action over the next year or so.
HT: Instapundit


For a lower level look at what the battle will be like see his report on embedding with the 2d Battalion of the British Rifle Regiment which seems to be too small of a unit for it’s mission.


Another key part of the battle will be carrying the war to the enemy which will mostly be Special Operations action. The London Telegraph gives a sanitized summary of what will happen.

It will be a tough year.

See also

Maothought or Who is Winning

Obama Says Bomb ’em
Les Solidat Americain dan Afganistan
East Meets West - President Obama in the Middle East
Mr President - Make a Decision
It's Now Obama's War

All my Afganistan posts.

The US Military - An Outside View

Dawn is a Pakistani news service. They recently posted an article by Kamran Shafi on his observations on the American Armed Forces. and the implications for the Pakistani Armed Forces.

I have been to Fort Myer in Virginia with my chum and course-mate Zafar Kayani who was married to Colonel Jo Ann Kayani, now sadly passed on, good and gracious woman. Jo Ann was commander of Headquarters Company, US Army, stationed at Fort Myer and it was my pleasure to visit not only her spartan office but also the canteen where officers ate alongside privates, carrying their own trays and standing in line waiting their turn. Fort Myer serves the Washington D.C. military district and the senior-most officers serving in the Pentagon live there. I have had the pleasure of seeing Gen Colin Powell, then chief of the joint staff, mow his own lawn in one of a row of houses that housed him and other senior generals including the chief of the army staff. The houses were in typically American suburban style: no walls, with sloping lawns running onto the pavements.

Most of all, I was astonished to see that there was no wedding hall anywhere in Fort Myer. Neither was there was any burger joint catering to all comers in any of the officers messes, and none of the mess buildings had bank branches and wedding dress boutiques in them. The US army had not constructed shops all around the fort either, and its soldiers did not sell pastries and bread. I saw no evidence of banks and travel agencies and textile mills and sugar factories and cornflakes-manufacturing mills and estate agencies being run by the US army (or the US navy and the US air force for that matter) in my travels across America. Armed forces stations were just that: armed forces stations with limited access to civilians, and those too who were accompanied by a member of the armed forces or their dependent(s). Neither, and this is important, does the US army run farming operations and get into disputes with the tenant farmers who till the land as share-croppers.

Since one mostly drives in the US to get from point A to B, many were the times that I came upon army convoys on the highways. Every single time the convoy travelled in the slow lane, at the designated speed, the drivers with both hands on the steering wheels, headgear on, looking straight ahead. No slouching, no cigarette hanging from the drooping lower lip Humphrey Bogart style. In the back, if there were soldiers being transported, they sat up straight, headgear on, no slouching, no smoking. And no leering at passing cars either!


Of course, with a closer view I saw the warts he missed, but his comments are appreciated. What he is talking about is an attitude in and out of the military; that is not dependent on this or that defense policy option, this or that weapons system, or budget level. Whatever is done with defense policy maintaining this attitude is vital.

--------------------------------------------------

Read the article, his comments on the current fighting in the Swat and Bruner areas is a different but worthwhile perspective than is given in the American news media.


HT: Pragmatic Euphony who provides a look from an Indian point of view.

The Iraq Situation

It has been five years since the invasion of Iraq. It has been almost a year since my last Iraq specific post. So I suppose it is time to look at the way things are going.

Back in February 2005 in An Event Table Not a Timetable I commented on the many calls for a “Timetable” to withdraw from Iraq:

Some are calling for the Administration to publish a timetable for withdrawal from Iraq. The Administration is politely declining to do so.


And so why not?

Any timetable assumes that specific events will happen before any point on the timetable. If the table is published all those who disagree, especially the insurgents, can plan their activities to ensure that the required events cannot happen on time. Even if militarily insignificant every failure to meet the table is a political and psychological defeat. All guerrilla wars are highly influenced by political and psychological factors. Announcing a timetable is a set up for embarrassment at least.


But doesn’t there have to be some sort of basis for planning?

Well yes, but a published timetable is not it. The proper way is to have a table of the desired events. This would underlie a timetable any way, but if the events move forward or backward, or are out of sequence we are not trapped by an artificial artifact.


And going out on a limb I pointed out one of the big events.

This week’s dead tree version [of the Army Times} carries the headline. “Your ‘Ticket Out of Iraq’ - 15,000 troops whose tours were extended are coming home – How fast can the Iraqi soldiers take over for the rest?” There is a four-page spread on different units and experiences in training Iraqi units. The Iraqi units involved are paired with US units. The message is clear “’get these guys trained!’ so we can come home and stay there.”

So how is this going? The Iraqi troops in the articles were “not up to US Army standards” but getting better. The US trainers had good relationships with the Iraqi’s and were confident in their success. The best overall source is from Global Security here and here. It appears that progress is being made - slowly.

And a quote from General Petraeus I had forgotten about “. . . I want to get the hell out of here."


It is symptomatic of the handling of the Defense Department that sending trainers to train the new Iraqi Army did not happen until close to 18 months after the collapse of the old Iraqi Army and the capture of Baghdad.

I spent most of my military time in training units, staffs and schools. Training an Army from the the ground up is a massive job, during a war is not the ideal time and place, even so it has taken longer than I expected.


In July 2007 I ranted about possibility of a A March UpCountry? included an overview of the situation:

The original insurgency of pro-Saddam Baathists has been effectively defeated since the end of 2005. Of course like all insurgencies some idiots will be throwing bombs for years, but it is really an Iraqi police problem at this point. Al Quida is on the run, its policy of trying to get Iraqi support by killing Iraqis, only got Iraqis mad. They may be more than a strict police problem at this point, but AQ is not likely to overthrow an Iraqi government of any type. Since about the beginning of 2006 a number of armed groups that had been sitting out the original insurrengency decided it was time to use force to get a better bargaining position for the final settlement, maybe even settle old scores, and get rid of some competitors. This is a very different dynamic than previously, which could be analyzed in the framework of standard guerilla warfare. Now we have groups that purport to represent major portions of Iraqi society, though if they weren’t armed and willing to kill people it is doubtful how much support they would have. When commentators in the last year or so have been worried that Iraq was slipping into a civil war they are expressing a concern that these groups may be able to pull whole sections of Iraqi society in to combat with other sections. Some of these groups have better outside forign connections than the Baathists which is why we are seeing more foreign (especially Iranian) weapons and other support than the Baathists received

The role of military action is limited but critical. They have to keep all the non-government factions from getting into a military position where they can dictate their terms, hurt them enough that a peaceful settlement will get them more than they have the ability to take by force. This has to be done without alienating the larger groups the militants claim to represent. Basically this is protecting the Iraqi Governments efforts to reach a peaceful settlement. The war will not be won by a straight military victory in the field, but also it can’t be done without military operations. The war can be lost militarily.


Now the the Long War Journal in [the] Iraqi Army presses into Sadr City tells us that

The Iraqi Army said three of its brigades were involved in the operation, and moved into Sadr City in seven convoys. Six of the nine available battalions from the three brigades were pushed into Sadr City. Between 4,000 and 5,000 Iraqi troops are now operating inside Sadr City.
The US military, including the advisory teams, has not entered the northern areas of Sadr City. "No U.S. troops have gone beyond Quds Street," said Lieutenant Colonel Steven Stover, the chief Public Affairs Officer for Multinational Division Baghdad, in an e-mail to The Long War Journal. "This is an Iraqi planned, led, and executed operation. US soldiers are providing advice, intelligence and enabling support."

This is an operation the size of the attack on Fullajah in November 2004. That the Iraqi's are able to launch it pretty much on their own is compelling evidence of a major training success for the Iraqi Army. It was the failure of a similar Iraqi only operation in December 2005-January 2006 that set the events in place that led to the surge. That operation failed because they did not have enough strength and too many of the units were not up to the opposition they faced. With the success of the Iraqi dominated operation in Basra recently it seems that the Iraqi Army has achieved a decent level of maturity.

The Long War Journal adds:

Sadr and his political movement have become increasingly isolated since the fighting began in Basrah, Baghdad, and the South. The Iraqi government, with the support of the political parties, said the Sadrist political movement would not be able to participate in upcoming provincial elections if it failed to disband the Mahdi Army. On April 13, the cabinet approved legislation that prevents political parties with militias from contesting provincial elections this year. The bill is now in parliament for approval. Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani, the top Shiite cleric in Iraq, said the Mahdi Army was not above the law and should be disarmed. Sadr has refused to disband the Mahdi Army.

Militarily, as noted above the original Baathist insurgency is defeated. Al Quida in Iraq is pretty much confined to the Mosul area and fighting to survive. Most of the Sunni groups have sought a separate peace with the Iraqi Government, and the Sadr forces are the last major Shia holdouts.



Some events that are late by any time table that would have been made in 2005, but real none the less.

Since you can click on my links and see how many predictions I got wrong, I’m not going to make any more.



My Iraq topic posts.

Book Review: Year of the Hangman

Year of the Hangman
George Washington’s Campaign Against the Iroquois
Glenn F. Williams
Westholme Publishing, 2005


When written in the handwriting of the time 1777 looked like a gallows, so it was the year of the hangman. One of the events that happened that year to justify this name was the most of the Iroquois Nation joined the British side of the American Revolution. An oppertunity for a title that is too good to pass up even if the main events of the book took place in 1779.
Update 8/15/07: The Author says his orginal title was "Not Merely Overrun But Destroy" quoting Genreral Washington’s orders to General Sullivan. The publisher decided otherwise.

The Iroquois lived in what is now west-central New York, but their influence among the other tribes to west was extensive, in modern terms we would even say imperialistic. They were one of the most powerful Indian Nations and had constantly sided with the British against the French. They were well rewarded for this in many ways, especially the British Governments policy of keeping white settlers from moving into Iroquois lands.

Both the British and Americans heavily lobbied the Iroquois and other tribes to either stay neutral or come in on their side. In 1777 four of Iroquois tribes, including the largest, came in as allies of the British and two as allies of the Americans. This created a series of campaigns that were a sideshow to the Revolution, but one of the major events in the history American relations with Native Americans. The most important event was the Sullivan Expedition of 1779, the focus of the book, which destroyed the Iroquois Nation as a major political and military force.



The British were hoping that the Iroquois would be a major help to the 1777 Burgoyne campaign to enter New York from Canada. Burgoyne was defeated before this could happen. In 1777 the Iroquois made many small raids on settlements and farms. Other than killing and capturing settlers, the main results was to force much American farmland out of production as the farmers were either killed or sought safety elsewhere. New York and Pennsylvana needed to keep part of their militias called out and several Continental Army regiments were diverted to the defense of the frontier. The only major American response was an attempt by the New York militia to defeat the Iroquois at the Battle of Oriskany. The Milita command was destroyed with few survivors.

In 1778 the campaign was much more active. In addition to many small raids, Cobles NY, Springfield NY, Andrustown NY, the Wyoming Valley PA, German Flats NY, and Cherry Valley NY were destroyed. By frontier standards these were fairly substantial towns, not isolated settlements. Most people managed to find refuge in the local fort but after the battle their homes and farms had been destroyed. The Wyoming Valley attacks were widely but incorrectly described a massacre of most of the civilians, but most the local militia was ambushed and destroyed. Even larger areas of food production were lost, either for the season or until the threat of attack was removed. The Americans were able to respond with only small counter attacks.

By 1779 General George Washington had developed the Continental Army to the point that it could take offensive operations against an objective within its means. New York City and Rhode Island, the principle British positions, were too well defended but there was enough troops for an expedition against the Iroquois. New York and Pennsylvania, two of the most important colonies, were demanding help in fighting the Iroquois. Using the lessons he had learned in the French and Indian War Washington proposed and got approval for a major expedition of Continental troops into the Iroquois homeland to destroy it economically. This would at the minimum distract the Iroquois from attacking the settlements for the season allowing harvesting the crops 1779. More importantly it would, if successful, take the Iroquois out of the war or at least cause enough damage reduce their ability to raid the settlements in future years.

Washington assembled a 5000 man Division of four brigades and a reinforced artillery regiment. This operation is commonly referred to as the Sullivan Expedition after it's commander Major General John Sullivan. A former militia officer from New Hampshire, he was not Washington’s first choice, a dependable though not brilliant officer, he seems to have had the characteristics Washington was looking for. Most of the army marched from the Wyoming Valley in Pennselvania up the Susquehanna River to meet up with a brigade from New York and then marched north through the heart of Iroquois home land turning west and going as far as Genesee destroying every town and field it found. Another Brigade was to go north from Pittsburgh up the Allegany River and return but it was not planned to junction with main army because it was impossible to coordinate the actions. Three of the brigades were regular line infantry and one was a light brigade to provide security against raids and ambushes of the main party. While there was no objection in the plan to battle with the Iroquois if it was offered, the objective was to destroy the economy of the Iroquois not fight a major battle. The force was intentionally too large to be defeated in a conventional battle by the forces the Iroquois and British had availble. If the light brigade could successfully guard against ambushes, fighting a conventional battle, was the only way to defeat the army. The biggest problem was setting up the logistics to move the column over a long distance. This delayed the start of the campaign, and even so for most of the expedition they were on half rations and eating Iroquois crops; harvested before burning the rest of field.

Though the Americans made attempts at security the general nature of the plan soon became common knowledge to the Iroquois and the British. Help was requested from British Canada but with little success because the British governor did not understand the seriousness of the threat, difficulty in sending support, and there was very little to send. Since the British were not sending help many Iroquois, who would have fought the American force if there a chance of winning, instead stayed home and evacuated their families.

The operation, planned for late spring, did not start until early fall because of supply problems. Sullivan moved his command at a steady march, with the light brigade protecting the front and flanks, and preparing defenses to defend against surprise attacks at night. The only significant battle was at Newtown New York where a force one-fifth the size of the Americans prepared an ambush on a good defensive position. It is interesting to note that the British wanted to fight a hit and run style while the Iroquois wanted to fight it out from a fixed position, most of the force was Iroquois so the British conceded. The Light Brigade discovered the position and with the artillery “amused” the defenders while two brigades went around the flank. The Iroquois/British force retreated before being trapped. The American force finished it’s march to Genesee with only minor engagements and one unsuccessful attempt by the Iroquois to ambush the advance guard. Since opposition was scattered the Americans came back by several routes destroying many villages and fields that were missed marching in.



Results.
Update: This section Rewritten 8/15/2007.

The most important result for the Americans was that the new government proved itself able to defend it’s citizens. New York and Pennsylvania were able to demobilize their militia. The Continental Army units involved were returned to the Main Army. This meant Washington could release the troops to oppose the British invaison in the south Farmland came back into production and normal economic activity was restored.

There was very little raiding of American settlements in 1779. 1780 saw a small revival of raids, but the Iroquois were no longer a military factor in the war. Most of the Iroquois had to live the winter of 1779-80 in Niagara and other places on British charity, which was slow in coming because the British did not have the resources and little ability to move what they had. This forced the British to divert resourses that could have gone to the main theater.

The Iroquois for the most part settled in Canada after the war. Central and Western New York were opened to settlement. The Council fire of the Iroquois Nation was extinguished.

Map: US Army Medcal Department

Analysis.

The Iroquois were in a losing position. Supporting the Americans if they won would give them some breathing room, but the march of the settlers opening one farm at a time would eventfully defeat them. Supporting the British if they won would leave them in the best position; the British would continue to prevent settlers from moving into Iroquois land. Supporting either side if they lost would be a disaster. Long-term neutrality was pretty much the same as losing no matter who won.

Alliances are always difficult; the British-Iroquois alliance was problematic at best. The British government saw this a sideshow and commited only minor resources. After the failure of the Burgoyne expedition the Iroquois assistance could distract the Americans but would never be decisive to the British. The British proved unable to provide major assistance in the event of a counter attack, although the British commanders on the ground did what they could to support the Iroquois. In lobbying for the Iroquois to join on the British side, they the Iroquois were lead to believe that the British would be able to provide more support that was physically or politically possible. This left the Iroquois in a an untenable position against an American response that was much larger than either the Iroquois or British expected.

Both the Americans and British sought Iroquois and other Indian support knowing that this would be warfare which did not recognize a protected status for women, children and other civilians. Of course, both sides made formal requests that the Indians not to attack women and children, and their representatives on site tried to prevent it, but they knew this could never have more than token results. Whites, espcially when separted from effective govermental authority sometimes responded in kind. Units, both British and Americn, under regular military discipline generally did not kill civilians. The Sullivan Expedition had very little contact with the Iroquois population since it was easy to move out of the way of the slow moving column. This was war directly or indirectly on civilian populations by both sides. It can be argued, truthfully, that the Sullivan Expedition was destroying a military base - a legitimate military target, but at the Iroquois' level of economic development the military base and the civilian infrastructure are the same thing.


Developing an Army the size of the Sullivan Expedition in Colonial America was not an easy proposition. If the revolution had not caused the development of the Continental Army which at that point knew how to operate in large units and manage logistics, it would have taken several years of frontier warfare before there was the political commitment to develop such an army. Two or three more years would be needed for recruiting and training. If the American-Iroquois conflict had developed outside the Revolution the Iroquois would have been in a better position to reach a favorable settlement or more likely delay the inevitable.

Of interest is the patterns of action demonstrated here that are typical of future American military actions especially in the future Indian Wars but also most wars where the the situation allowed. The large campaign into Indian country was common in all the major Indian wars, usually successful though the St Clair Defeat in 1791 and the Custer defeat in 1876 are the obvious exceptions. Also typical are a campaign objective to take the enemy out of the war, attacking economic objectives, use of regulars or more often volunteers trained to regular standards, the milita being relegated to secondary roles.

Though he was not the field commander for the expedition, the planning reflects Washington’s experience in the French and Indian War. He spent part of that war defending the Virginia frontier with militia, which was often ineffective and very expensive to maintain. His first offensive action was leading a regiment to capture Fort Duquesne (Pittsburg) that ended in the defeat at Fort Necessity; much of the failure of this expedition was due to poor planning and logistics. Next he participated in General Braddock’s almost successful approach to Fort Duquesne. That defeat, despite popular mythology was do to the ineptitude of the advance guard commander not General Braddock. Lastly he participated in General John Forbes successful capture of Fort Duquesne. Basic themes he learned through this school of hard knocks, the militia is not dependable if you need more than a home guard, while “Indian fighting” units are necessary to maintain security, regular forces win battles, and the need for careful planning and logistics management. His careful detailed instructions and supervision to General Sullivan reflected this; he also personally selected the commander of the Light Brigade that would provide security. He put his personal authority behind getting General Sullivan the logistics he needed. This is very similar to his actions as President during Antohny Wayne's 1794 campaign in Ohio.

This book won the Thomas Fleming Award for the Best Book in Revolutionary War History of 2005 and is also a finalist for the Army Historical Foundation's Distinguished Writing Award, to be announced in June 2006.

It has maps that provide some context but they are not keyed to the chapter where they are located, have much extraneous information but leave out key locations mentioned in the text. This book may be a to specialized and detailed to hold the interest of a general reader who does not come with an interest in the topic. However, I found the book to be interesting and very informative, especially about 18th Century frontier warfare. For a reader with an interest in the topic it is worthwhile addition to one’s book shelf.

Thanks to R.J. Rummel of Democratic Peace for bringing this book to my attention.

Viet Nam 1966 vs Iraq 2004

Today Phil Carter of Intel Dump posted a comparison of US Casualties in Viet Nam in 1966 with Iraq in 2004. He and Owen West have a companion article on Slate. They have made a “constant casualties” comparison, similar to a “constant dollars” comparison, of these two sets of casualties. Their thesis is that relative to the size of the forces involved we are taking casualties at the same rate in Iraq as in Viet Nam. They are questioning the opnion that some people draw that since the number of casualties in absolute numbers is less in Iraq than in Viet Nam that Iraq is a much eaiser war. I am sure that everyone agrees that no causalty is light to his or her family.

I have no doubt that they are correct. One of their examples is to compare the Battles of Hue (1968) and Fulajah, and note that the casualty rates are pretty much the same.
The dynamics of a fight are more or less the same with little reference to the larger situation of the war. This how a military staff can estimate with reasonable certainty the number of casualties a given operation will receive. The US Army’s FM 101-10-2 (NOTE Very Large PDF file) is a series of tables with historic rates of just about everything measurable that happens in a battle. Included are tables for estimating casualties based on experience from several wars. Find the right row (assault of a fortified position) and estimated number of days and multiply by the size of the attacking force. Such tables should always be taken with large grain of salt when making future estimates, but is amazing how close they come to reality if you compare actual casualties to what actually happened after the fact. I would have been very surprised that if the Battles of Hue and Fulajah had very different casualty rates. Over all casualties would be subject to a number of different factors but it would be reasonable to assume that casualty rates for the war as a whole would be close.

I think that this sort of comparison minimizes the very big differences between the two wars. If we compare these wars to Mao Zedung’s theory of guerilla war we see some very big differences. In Viet Nam in 1966 the North Viet Namese were enaged in a Phase III campaign which is characterized by engaging the governments forces in conventional warfare to bring on final victory. US combat units were introduced because the South Viet Namese Army was stretched to thin to handle this threat. In Iraq we are facing an enemy who is struggling to break out of Phase I operations. The analogy may not quite hold since the insurgents are using the urban warfare methods pioneered in Chechnya. While the dynamics of individual combats remain the same, the Iraq actions are taking place in a very different situation than Viet Nam.

In an earlier post Maosthought or Who is Winning? I used Mao’s three phase theory of guerilla war to provide a tool for evaluating the success or failure of guerilla/counter guerialla operations. Read it and form your own opnion on our success or failure in Iraq. It seems to me that the insurregents are failing to make milestones to move to phase II, or when the get their temporarily they get pushed back. However it also seems that we are slow in making our milestones to defeat the insurrgency in the Sunni Triangle. Guerilla wars are never quick and easy.

MaoThought or Who is Winning?

We keep hearing a lot of noise on who is winning in Iraq and what is happening. This is submitted as a minor contribution to making sense of the noise. It is intended as a general explanation which I will leave to the reader to apply to Iraq or some other guerilla war

To me the tool to understand the military situation in Iraq is to look at Mao Zedung’s famous theory of guerilla war. This is widely accepted as a valid model whether or not one buys the ideology Mao raps it in. If not held to rigorously it can describe guerrilla wars even if the people involved never heard of Mao or intentionally follow his concept.

Mao proposed that a successful guerilla war goes through three phases:

Organization Phase:
Build up a structure of ‘cadres’ to organize population support (‘agit-prop’ teams to develop popular awareness / use of ‘selective terror’ against government officials, to eliminate landlords and others the population disliked, and to deter informers.

Guerilla Phase:
Introduce guerilla attacks and ambushes (to acquire weapons and blow up infrastructure) à make it difficult for governments to maintain a military presence (creation of ‘liberated areas)’

Mobile War (Third Phase)
Amounted to civil war / force government forces to retreat to major cities until these were surrounded by a hostile countryside.



In general we can describe the process as:

The Organization Phase is characterized by terrorist type attacks. The government forces become progressively spread out in small detachments to protect the population. A small force can attack any of a large number of lightly or undefended targets, which will require a large number of small detachments to defend.

The government's response, in addition to defending critical positions, it aggressively engages in collecting intelligence, police activities, and military patroling. It wants to quickly idenity the guerillas and destroy them before the the war can progress.


The Guerrilla Phase takes advantage of the fact that there can’t be enough troops to defend every thing; and small detachments are subject to attack by larger but still relatively small forces. The guerillas develop forces capable of engaging in small military actions with the intent to destroy stationary detachments or small patrols. They avoid fighting any large formation. The guerilla phase attempts to secure a liberated area (i.e. a base) for third phase operations by creating an area that is the government forces cannot occupy.

The government response is to defend key positions, find and destroy the guerilla units, disrupt the support for these units, and prevent the creation of a base area.

In the Mobile Phase, having secured a good base area, the guerrillas build a “mobile” or quasi-regular force that is able to defeat medium or large government regular units. If the government concentrates forces to defeat the mobile force it abandons a fatal amount of its territory, if it doesn’t the mobile force defeats the government units piecemeal. In either case it forced back to the major cities and has to surrender or starve to death.

The government forces need to destroy the mobile forces and recapture the base area.

Phase three may involve outside intervention, either the guerillas bring in a foreign army to be the mobile force as an alternative or addition to their own, or the government invites foreign troops because it does not have enough strength to both defeat the mobile force and hold the country side.



Historically an effective counter tactic in all phases is for the government to try to create its own guerilla structure in enemy areas until they can recapture it. Operation Phoenix in Viet Nam is one of the most famous (or if you prefer infamous) examples.


There is nothing automatic about this strategy and it fails more often than it succeeds.
Even at phase three, phase one and two operations never stop. Moving to the next phase without successful preparation is usually fatal. The guerillas can be defeated and the phase progression turned around at any point. Usually the primary reason the government loses is it loses it's nerve, which may or may not be related to the military situation.




Some key elements needed for success are a cause, leadership, a fighting force, and at least minority of the population willing to support the cause. These and the need to create a base provide targets that the government forces can attack to defeat the guerillas


Cause

People have to fight for something. This type of operation is to long and costly for mercenaries. It can be real or invented, held by a small group or a large group, but there has to be something to motivate the people who will actually do the working and fighting.

The government response is to provide a better cause and/or discredit the guerilla cause.

Active propaganda methods, control of news media, and tight discipline of military units to prevent incidents that can be used to inflame a cause are important to both sides.

Leadership.

Strong, usually charismatic, leadership is necessary at all levels and especially the top. The guerilla force will be operating under adverse conditions they need to be able to look to their leadership to give them confidence. Also operations require careful planning and execution, which needs leadership.

The government response is to find, kill, arrest, convert, or neutralize the guerilla leadership. It also needs to provide alternate leadership for it’s own cause

Fighting Force

Wars are fought with armies. Even though it is a guerilla force, it is subject the same dynamics as any other army. Actually the operational conditions for the guerillas are extremely harsh.

The government attacks the cohesion of the guerilla fighting force in the same way as any other army, defeating them in battle, setting a pace that is to fast for effective reaction, denying supplies, propaganda aimed at morale, etc.


Population:

In Mao’s phrase this is the sea in which the guerrilla fish swim. A small minority of the population actively supporting the guerillas is all that is necessary if the rest are passive, however the smaller the percentage the greater the need for terrorist type activities. The terrorist option has the potential to backfire, whether of not the population likes the government, guerilla terrorist acts against the population, to enforce support, can alienate the population from the the guerillas.

The Government response is to create any sort of incentive to move the population from active support of the guerillas to passive and from passive to active government support. Also physically isolating the guerrillas from the population is effective. Chasing the guerrilla so hard that they do not have time to interact with the civilian population is effective.

Both sides face the continuing problem of conducting successful combat operations without alienating the population where they take place

A Base

Guerillas, like any human being, need a place to sleep, eat, train and feel relatively safe. For this they need a base area. The size and sophistication will increase as the movement grows. Maybe safe houses and campsites at phase one, installations capable of supporting the logistics of a 5000 to 20000 man force at phase three. Mao used the very vastness of China. More likely, since most guerilla wars are fought in a more restricted area, guerillas seem to prefer the opposite side of a foreign border that the government cannot afford to violate. The creation of adequate bases is both a necessary goal for the first two phases and a perquisite to advance to the last two phases.

The government response is to prevent the creation of bases, and destroy them when they exist.



A New Twist – an Urban Strategy.

Increasingly there is a major draw back to Mao’s concept; Mao assumes that most of the population is rural and moving into the cities in force is the last part of the Mobile Phase. It also assumes that it would be difficult for government forces to know what is happening in the hinterlands. However the population of the world is becoming more and more urban, the groups supporting the “Cause” are likely to be urban with a dislike of camping in the woods. Modern surveillance technology makes isolated groups in outside the urban built up area stand out for investigation/destruction, where as they can be lost in background of a city. Unfortunately the Chechens have found a potential alternative, which seems to be in use in Iraq.

T. C. Wretchard of the Belmont club pointed to two articles by LTC Timothy Thomas (Retired) of the U. S. Army’s Foreign Military Studies Office at Global Security and in the Army War Collage's magazine Parameters describing the Chechen statagy.


The guerilla force takes over a neighborhood or small city by infiltration, coordination with local supporters and or criminal elements. In some cases such as the beginning of the First Chechen war the Government forces is not in control of the urban area. In others it gains control by attacking police stations staffed only for normal law enforcement activities. The government forces will have to counter attack. The guerillas conduct a “defenseless defence” of ambushes, sniping and small attacks aimed more at causing damage to the attacking force than actually holding any particular place. After being defeated they move to a new neighborhood or city and repeat. And repeat until the government is forced to give up. The Chechens fought the Russians to a stand still in the first Chechen war.

The preparations including terrorist type attacks seem to be analogous to phase one, the above to phase two. Presumably at some point there could be shift to offensive (phase three,) operations where the guerillas seek out government regular forces to destroy them.

The first problem to this approach is that it seems to jump Mao’s development process, possibly leaving the guerilla force isolated, without adaquet preperation, and unable to prevent it’s destruction by government forces that have not been worn down in a long campaign.

The second problem to this approach seems to me is that fighting battles on top of the population can be counter productive. What ever they think of the respective causes there is the possibility that the population will individually or collectively take action to prevent the battle, such as informing to the government forces before a new iteration can be started. But the government forces have a similar problem in reverse.


The above provides a basis for analysis. Remember all guerilla wars involve many battles, and for who ever wins, it is always two steps forward and one step back. Look for patterns not specific incidents. Read news stories for facts related to the items presented above, not the authors slant. The reader can apply this on their own to the situation in Iraq or elsewhere, though later I may make a new post with my own analysis.


Related posts.

December: Viet Nam 1966 vs Iraq 2004

February: An Event Table Not a Timetable

August: Escalate in Iraq

June 2006 Book Review: Year of the Hangman

July 2007 A March Up Country?

January 2008 Tet 1968: A Personal Narrative

May 2008 The Iraq Situation

March 2012 Book Review: Dien Bien Phu - Hell in a Very Small Place


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Alexander the Average has published a different sort of metrics. Here is the description of his metrics. A different approach than I took but very good. He promises to update and when he does I will add the new link.