The Tet Offensive occurred
50 years ago.
The Year of the Monkey
Nineteen Sixty-Eight was a strange
year. First there was Tet or Vietnamese New Years, the occasion for the North
Vietnamese offensive. Then I was in the hospital for a week, which was the week
of the Martin Luther King riots. I spent the week lying on my back watching the
country burn down on TV. Then there was the Democratic Convention. Some said
they would disrupt the convention. The Mayor said he was going to protect the
right of people to peacefully hold a political convention. It was clear that if
you liked to bash in heads for fun or else have your head bashed that was the
place to be. I did not care for either so I stayed home. Generally, it seemed
like rioting was the recreation of choice that year around the world, the
tactics and method of the “sixty- eighters,” if not their stated goals, seemed
awfully brown shirtish. There seemed to be general mood that year that things
were bad and getting worse. The year wasn’t all bad; I escaped (graduated) from
high school and went to college.
The War at Home
This was the height of the Viet Nam
war. Going to school in the morning, right in front of our school bus was the
Navy ambulance bus taking casualties from the Air Station to the Naval Hospital.
I remember sitting on my parent’s sofa watching the news. Not news of improvised
explosive devices (IEDs) and suicide idiots that everyone takes so seriously
these days; but regular armies with trained soldiers and manufactured explosive
devices, maneuvering divisions and engaging in major battles. Two hundred to
three hundred US dead a week, week in week out. North Viet Nam was being
bombed, but apparently under so many restrictions it was almost useless. There
were negotiations about the shape of the peace table if there were ever real
peace negotiations. It seemed a Dien Bien Phu II was shaping up at Khe Shan. A
truce had been announced by both sides for the Tet holiday, the question being
when and where the North Vietnamese would violate it. They violated it
everywhere. Saigon, Hue, Dak To, Da Nang, Pleiku all with enemy forces in the
city. The US Embassy in Saigon occupied. The walled citadel of Hue, the old
Vietnamese Imperial capital, was lost. News coming so fast you couldn’t absorb
it. That week, over seven hundred dead. Like Nine Eleven, everyone was sitting
glued to the TV watching the bad news. Unlike Nine Eleven no stories of
dramatic escapes and heroic rescues.
On the third day the New York news
teams got to Viet Nam to report what happened. I remember watching Walter
Cronkite in dirty wrinkled fatigues and a dented helmet reporting how serious
things were, if we actually survived this battle you knew the war was lost. He repeated this in a TV Special report a few weeks later. Statements by military press officers were ridiculed.
This was a shock wave. The net
effect of months of watching heavy fighting on television, the staggering scope
of the enemy attack, along with a narrative that said we were defeated even if
we survived this battle changed the mood of the country. The next few years are
only understandable when you realize we were in a state of national “ongoing traumatic stress syndrome.”
US and South Vietnamese forces
defended and attacked to no pattern we saw in the media. The Embassy was
recaptured. The Battle of Hue dragged on forever. It was agreed to end the
negotiations about negations and have negotiations on the same subjects as the
negotiations about negotiations. The war seemed to continue as before. Johnson
stopped the bombing of North Vietnam not for any gain but because he thought it
would help win the 1968 election. Even so Nixon won the 1968 election.
Nixon invaded Cambodia. This
resulted in riots in the US that culminated in the Kent State incident. Next
Nixon invaded Laos. In 1972 North Vietnamese tanks crossed the border. To read
the newspaper headlines or watch the TV news it seemed things were getting
worse. A keystone of Nixon’s policy was the Vietnamization program of upgrading
the South Vietnamese Army and tuning things over to the South Vietnamese. The
media reported every problem and generally trashed the program. A company went
berserk at My Lai and massacred about a hundred people, apparently covered up
by the Army. The Special Forces tried to but failed to liberate some POW’s in
North Viet Nam. In 1972 the bombing of North Viet Nam was resumed, including
this time the ports and Red River Delta. The press and others were frantic;
this was an escalation that would bring China into the war.
But then, almost from no place, the
1972 peace agreement was signed. The US and the North Vietnamese agreed to a
cease fire and to mutually withdrawal from South Viet Nam. The US was allowed
to keep a very finite number of advisors and promised to come to the aid of
South Viet Nam if North Vietnam went back on the agreement. In the press it
seemed like a face saving surrender. There was some doubt that the US would
keep its promise. (At this point I remember in our first week of Officers Basic
they told us that even if we volunteered we could not go to Vietnam, the mock
groan of disappointment was overwhelming.)
Nixon cut corners to be sure he won
reelection in 1972 against one of the most unelectable Democratic candidates
ever. His burglars were caught at Democratic headquarters in the Watergate
Apartments; the step by step investigations eventually forced him to resign in
1974. But he was politically paralyzed long before that, and his successor was,
by default, a seat warmer until the 1976 elections.
In 1975 South Vietnam fell.
Congress made it clear we would not keep the promise to come to South Viet
Nam’s aid. The first wave of boat people came to the US. The second wave was
abandoned at sea. South Vietnam was put under a totalitarian regime that
rivaled anything of Hitler, Mao or Stalin. The same for Laos. But this was child
play compared to what the Khmer Rouge (Communist Party) did in the killing
fields of Cambodia.
Bandaging The Wounds
I think three things aided national
reconciliation,
- The Independence Bi-Centennial
celebration in 1976. This turned everyone’s attention to something all could
agree on or at least use the same words if we didn’t agree.
- Richard Nixon and Watergate. He
became the scapegoat for everything from 1954 to 1975. He was guilty of enough
that no one cared if he was being accused of things he didn’t or couldn’t have
done. “It’s all Nixon’s fault”, even if it wasn’t, was a statement that allowed
people to avoid accusing friends neighbors and relatives of supporting the
“wrong” side, whichever side that was.
- And a number of myths about the
war grew and were accepted. Often not factual, but allowing people to live
together, except when one myth challenged another, or worse, was challenged by
facts.
And we went from “ongoing” to “posttraumatic
stress syndrome.”
The Real War
Some of this was apparent at the
time, to a political and military geek such as myself, much I learned later.
In 1959 the North Vietnamese
Government ordered the Viet Cong to begin military action to take over
South Viet Nam. They used the classic guerilla war pattern of Mao Zedong. They
were greatly helped because they had much more resources than normal to start
up a guerilla campaign. Much of the prepatory work had been done by the old
Viet Minh while fighting the French, there was logistic support from North
Vietnamese base areas in Laos and Cambodia, the South Vietnamese government had
major problems, really the problems of any third world government, but easy to
exploit. By 1965 this campaign had progressed to Mao’s third or mobile phase.
The South Vietnamese were in a bind. They had no uncommitted reserves. (I think
I remember reading at the time that South Viet Nam had one or two battalions
available everything else was committed). And the North Vietnamese were massing
a mobile force of Viet Cong and North Vietnamese divisions to finish off
their victory. If the South Vietnamese army consolidated forces to defeat the
mobile units they would abandon a fatal amount of territory, but leaving their
forces disbursed meant their units would be destroyed one at a time by the enemy
mobile forces.
The solution was the introduction
of US combat units to fight the North Vietnamese mobile forces, and have the
South Vietnamese deal with the guerillas. (This was the general plan though
there were exceptions, such as the Army Special Forces and the Marine CAP
platoons, and token South Vietnamese forces always accompanied large US
operations.)
The introduction of US troops put
the North Vietnamese generals in a bind. They could not defeat the US Army and
Marines in the field. Not that they didn’t try. Through 1965, 1966 and into
1967 they launched a number of operations trying to defeat the US forces. They
quickly learned that human wave attacks against fire bases using howitzers as
shotguns was suicidal. Sometimes they would win against a small unit but they
could never win against a force large enough to advance Mao’s mobile war
strategy. All they ended up with was massive amounts of casualties; even the
small battles they won were often Pyric victories. They needed to change their strategy.
Their problem was Mao’s theory said
they had to capture the county side first before moving into the cities.
Prematurely moving into the cities would cut them off from their bases and
invite destruction. But they were unable to defeat US forces to take over the
countryside. There were two proposals considered, to back off the lower level
phases of guerrilla war to wear down the US so it would grow tired and
withdraw, or launching a major offensive to dislodge the US forces. They
decided to take a long shot gamble on the later.
It was always possible to
infiltrate the cities but anything larger than a patrol that could melt into
the population could not survive the counter attack. They decided if they
infiltrated enough forces into the cities, launched a surprise attack and
captured enough critical points they could survive the counter attack and it
would be the US forces that were cut off. They expected that there would be a
large response to a call for a popular uprising. Success required they obtain
firm control over their critical targets in the first twenty-four hours or so
isolating the US forces from their bases.
They obtained initial surprise. We
knew what their doctrine was, we believed it was a good doctrine, but we did not
realize they were so desperate that they would throw it out on a gamble.
They got into the cities, captured
large amounts of space. They got control of civilian areas that had no defense
force beyond local police. A call for a general uprising was made. The Viet
Cong political officers came out and started to organize a new government and
had “counter revolutionaries” rounded up and executed.
Many South Vietnamese and US units
were isolated, a few were destroyed. Support units of all types became infantry
to survive. But most held until relived or even counter attacked.
There was no popular uprising. The
North Vietnamese captured no critical military bases. The combat units in the
field turned around and came back to the cities, made sure the bases were
secure and cleared the cities. That sounds so easy, it wasn’t. By the third day
it was clear the offensive had failed. The North Vietnamese were still in
control of most of what they had captured, but couldn’t take more and were
being attacked. There were still several months of fierce fighting to clear the
cities and restore the pre-offensive status and several more months to exploit
the situation.
In many areas the defeat of the
offensive resulted in the destruction of the local Viet Cong infrastructure.
Many Viet Cong units joined the offensive and were lost or seriously damaged.
After a few months when units with the name and number of a Viet Cong unit
rejoined the fight it was almost exclusively staffed with North Vietnamese.
When the local Viet Cong political cadres outed themselves to set up a new
government their identities became common knowledge. Killing the counter
revolutionaries left a lot of people who wanted revenge for dead relatives and
friends. They were known and easy target for Operation Phoenix. In many places
vigilantes acting on their own killed them. The Viet Cong’s local political
organization never recovered though it took a long time exploit this.
The Vietnamization program, which
really should have started earlier, meant pulling units off line giving them a
rest, new equipment, time to train and develop confidence. When it went back on
line it was a much better trained, equipped and confident force. They were able
to slowly gain control over larger areas of the countryside on their own. By
1972 guerilla activity had ceased to be a major problem in much of South Viet
Nam. (I read a news report that in parts of the Mekong delta the per capita
rate of “guerilla attacks” was about the same as the pre-WWII per capita rate
of criminal activity.) Aggressive large operations such as the border crossings
gradually reduced the North Vietnamese Armies ability to conduct large scale
operations in South Viet Nam. When the North Vietnamese crossed the DMZ in a
tank assault in 1972 it was the South Vietnamese Army that stopped them.
US units were being withdrawn.
Because of the individual replacement policy there were very few unit
homecomings to make this visible in the US. A unit was deactivated in place
it’s people redistributed and that many replacements were not sent. By 1972
most US combat troops were gone.
Ending the War
So long as North Viet Nam could
they would continue to send its armed forces to south to capture South Viet
Nam. Attacking North Viet Nam involved risks of escalating the war by bringing
in China or Russia to help North Viet Nam. This was a real risk though it
probably played larger in Washington’s mind than was the real case. How to
convince them? Negotiations by themselves would not do it. The North Vietnamese first and last negotiating position was that they would get complete control of all
Viet Nam. Invasion and regime change of North Viet Nam (to use the current
term) was politically impossible in the US political situation. Bombing risked
intervention and excessive political fallout if not successful in a short
period of time.
Nixon’s National Security Advisor
(and later Secretary of State) Henry Kissinger had a plan.
The first part was for the vigorous
prosecution of the war in South Viet, as well as destroying bases in
sanctuaries in Cambodia and Laos.
The second was Vietnamization
program to turn the war back to South Viet Nam. This would allow the US to
leave at some point.
The third was to give both China
and Russia a reason not to intervene if bombing in the North was resumed.
Fourth was to launch a bombing
campaign that would make North Viet Nam agree to stop the war in the South.
While it wasn’t obvious in the news
Russia and China did not get along. In 1969 they even had a large border fight
in Manchuria. China refused to let Russia transship to North Viet Nam across
Chinese territory. Most of the equipment that North Viet Nam needed to support
the war came from Russia and was unloaded at the port of Haiphong. China was
only able to provide basic infantry weapons and a large manpower pool if they
intervened, which North Viet Nam probably did not want because they could not
be sure it go away after the war. This was an opportunity. If a strategic
bombing program could close Haiphong Harbor and hit other high value targets,
North Viet Nam would not get the weapons and supplies it needed to prosecute
the war, or maintain a basic economy, and possibly stay in power.
Kissinger opened a diplomatic
campaign to make both Russia and China feel they had more to lose by intervening
to support North Viet Nam than if they just left it to it’s own devices. To the
Russians he opened a softening of détente including signing the ABM and
SALT weapons reduction treaties. To China he offered diplomatic recognition and
opening of trade relations. President Nixon’s famous visit to China in 1972,
was part of this campaign.
The strategic bombing campaign was
started. It closed Haiphong Harbor. Bridges on major highways were destroyed.
North Viet Nam had to agree to withdraw in order for their government to
survive. But it did not change their goal of taking over the South.
An agreement was signed. POW’s came
home. Both sides withdrew. South Viet Nam started to recover from the war.
North Viet Nam rebuilt it’s Army. In 1975 they attacked with fourteen divisions
from Cambia, Laos, and North Viet Nam. South Viet Nam asked the US for air
support, the request was denied despite our promise in the peace agreement.
This caused the South Vietnamese Government to panic, and the war was lost. The
general opinion is that South Viet Nam could have held with air support and
quite possibly without it if they had not panicked.
Collateral Damage
Today, 1:29 PM
You
At the
beginning of the war, the President of Viet Nam was Ngo Ding Diem. He had
worked long and hard for independence and do develop the country and fight the
Viet Cong. Perhaps not the favorite of many South Vietnamese factions he was
the properly elected leader of the country and acceptable to most
factions. Unfortunately, he did not meet the expectations of many in the
Kennedy administration and it’s supporters. A group of generals overthrew and
killed him in a coup in 1963. Kennedy knew about the Coup and gave at
least passive support. This coup and several that followed greatly
damaged the credibility of the South Vietnamese government.
Negotiations had started early in
the war. They preliminary negotiations stalled. The North Vietnamese insisted
that they and the Viet Cong be separate parties and negotiate with US only.
Accepting this would deny that the US was helping a sovereign government
against foreign attack. The US and South Viet Nam insisted that the US and
South Viet Nam be separate parities and negotiate with North Viet Nam only.
Accepting this would deny that the Viet Cong was an indigenous uprising. Every
so often one side would make a proposal that the other found unacceptable,
which had an annexed diagram for a negotiating table, about the least important
part of the proposal. The press, especially television, only reported on the shape
of the table. (After the war North Viet Nam’s military published in their
professional journals a number of “how we won articles” that make it clear that
the Viet Cong was always an instrument of North Vietnamese policy and never an
indigenous movement or independent organization.) After the Tet offensive
President Johnson to proposed a plan that sidestepped the issue by ignoring it,
thus doing nothing to advance the negotiations or produce peace; and got the
North Vietnamese to agree to the proposal by stopping the bombing. Both of
which Johnson also believed would help a in the 1968 elections.
The Cold War standoff with the
Soviet Union resulted in a de facto policy of what was called Mutually
Assured Destruction (MAD) though it always seemed to me that something like
Massively Asinine Dumbness would be a better name. A central concern was to
prevent an escalation of violence to the point where nuclear weapons were used.
This concern had a major impact on US military policy during the war. On one
hand President Johnson considered a withdrawal or defeat as politically
unacceptable. On the other hand, the question he asked was how to prevent
escalation, not how to end the thing. As a result, the Johnson kept the war in
“maintenance mode” with no purpose or end in sight. Maybe earlier in the war
there was no way to end it without unacceptable escalation, maybe not, but the
“no escalation” groupthink prevented serious consideration of how to end the
war.
The press’s “investigative
reporting” of the My Lai massacre broke the story two weeks after an Article 32
board returned an indictment. Article 32 Boards are public hearings, following a major investigation that took over at a year. It
developed that there had been a few small incidents like this, the Army and
Marines investigating and prosecuting whenever there was evidence to convict.
The press usually knew about these but did not report them until after the My
Lai incident and the Army made formal charges.
Unlike most of today’s news
persons, the main news teams in New York had been covering wars since WWII and
were usually pretty good military analysts in their own right. In addition to
his confidence building style Walter Cronkite of CBS news was one of the best.
It is hard to imagine when he made that report from a five star hotel in
Saigon, with borrowed fatigues and helmet that he did not understand the actual
situation.
The war needed large amounts of
men. The draft was unpopular. Calling up National Guard and reserves for the 1962 Berlin crisis caused so much political costs that the administration did not want to repeat. Secretary
of Defense Robert MacNamara announced, purportedly as an effort to help the poor
and disadvantaged, that 100,000 men would be drafted who did not meet the
normal minimum standards for military service. In addition to taking casualties at much higher rate, these men received no
benefit for their post service life. But the middle class served as a much lower rate or in safer positions,
which many believe was the real purpose of the program.
Thousands of Vietnamese “boat people”
came the US at the fall of South Viet Nam. (Many got on boats and sailed to US
ships thus the term.) Later, in response to the communists “reeducation”
polices there was a mass emigration from Viet Nam by boat, it was clear if the
President ordered the navy to pick them up he would have major confrontation in
Congress he could not win, so the Navy was ordered not pick them up, even if
the boat was not seaworthy and sinking.
Summation
At the 1974 conference on missing in action servicemen, a (North) Vietnamese Colonel was asked about the North
Vietnamese Army never wining a significant battle against the US military. He
responded
“So What!”
[I have since found out the actual quote
was: "That
may be so, but it is also irrelevant."]
A summery of Mau Zeitung’s guerilla war doctrine, essential
to understand the war.
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
This is an edited and slightly
expanded copy of the post I made on the 40th anniversary of the
Offensive.
Hanks Eclectic Meanderings
My summery of Mao’s three phase guerilla war theory.
Wikipedia
South Vietnamese
Commonwealth
North Vietnamese
US Army Center for Military History Published material – Viet Nam
Myths
The History Place
International Socialist Review
