Showing posts with label escalation. Show all posts
Showing posts with label escalation. Show all posts

Friday, March 18, 2011

Libya

Robert Haddock in an article at Forign Policy warns International airpower will be enough to escalate the civil war in Libya, but not to win it.

After a very short discussion, the U.N. Security Council, led by Britain and France, passed a resolution on March 17 that authorizes the use of military force against Col. Muammar al-Qaddafi's regime and forces. The resolution permits the use of "any means necessary" but prohibits a foreign military occupation of Libya. It specifically calls for a no-fly zone and the use of force to protect civilians. The rapid advance of pro-Qaddafi forces toward Benghazi forced the United States to quickly harden its position. Equally surprising were abstentions by China and Russia, allowing the resolution to pass.

SNIP

Obama administration officials may have thought they would have many more days, or possibly weeks, to organize a multilateral response to the Libyan situation. It seems clear they badly misjudged the timetable pro-Qaddafi forces have been able to maintain.

SNIP

Although the French government boasted that air strikes against Qaddafi's forces would begin within a few hours after the Security Council vote, organizing an air campaign that will have a meaningful effect on Qaddafi's ground forces will take much longer to organize. Most crucial in this regard is Obama's hesitancy to have U.S. military forces in the lead in this operation. Second is the strong desire by Western powers to have Arab military participation (Qatar and United Arab Emirates are mentioned), hopefully in the very first waves of attacking aircraft. Take away the United States, the most powerful and experienced air power, and add in completely inexperienced Arab air forces, and the result will be many long planning meetings as various European and Arab political and military leaders attempt to cobble together a multilateral air force.

SNIP

Although his overseas bank accounts have been seized, Qaddafi already has the necessary money, troops, weapons, and ammunition to sustain a low intensity but brutal campaign against the rebels. The investigation begun by the International Criminal Court has left him and his sons with little choice but to fight on. The United Nations has authorized the wide-ranging use of air power against his regime. Air power will be enough to escalate this war but not enough to win it. Although prohibited for now by the Security Council, "boots on the ground" will eventually be required to remove Qaddafi and his sons from Libya.

Read the entire Article and click on it’s links for more background.

Analysis.

While his word choice of “quagmire” might be a bit hyperbolic he highlights the basic problem.

The basic Western policies of supporting democracy, opposing pigs like Qaddafi, humanitarian protection, maintaining peace or least stability to say nothing of a stable oil supply do not seem to Western political leaders to be supportable by normal political means. It was hoped that the rebels would be able to oust Qaddafi but rather it seems they will lose without outside intervention. The UN Securty Council res0lution is an escalation of the means to obtain this goal.

The Just War Doctrine and plain common sense state there should be a reasonable probability of success for launching a military operation. A no fly zone has about zero possibility of success and limited air strikes slightly better. The only thing that is likely to succeed is a full scale attack, ground sea and air, to effect regime change. As noted in the article this will take more time to set up than exists. While one hopes that the calls for only a no fly zone are based on genuine humanitarian motivations, I can’t help but get the feeling that this is an attempt to put a foot in the door to justify a more serious action later. There is a possibility that after removing Qaddafi it will develop into an insurgency but the quicker the action the less chance of that happening.

I am not at all enthusiastic about this operation, and I really doubt it is mandated by our national interest, but if it is to be a success strike hard and fast, don’t pussy foot around with no fly zones and the like. It will save many lives and much suffering in the long run.

Read the whole article


Related

Libya


Never Again and Again and Again
Rwanda and Darfur Compared


See Also
What is Genocide

Tuesday, December 15, 2009

Afganistan:Looking at the Surge

Now that President Obama has make His decision to surge* in Afganistan, it is a good time to look at what we can expect. Our forces and those of are allies are streched thin with little in country reserves. It seems there will be a major Taliban offensive come spring, if they don't launch one we will. The surge should provide the troops to deal with it, and counter attack. Personally I think 30,000 (four maybe five regimental/brigade combat teams with support troops) is to few but that is as much as will be available to move by spring. More will certainly need to follow especially to take advantage of what develops by summer. The enemy has no way to develop his actions to Mao Zetung’s mobile phase where they could win a purely military victory. Without doing that they will lose unless the we get tired or lose patience and withdraw. They will try to deny us access to the civilian population and ware down our will to fight and hope they can cause enough hurt that the President will cut his losses in August 2011. The fighting will be in Afghanistan the real war will be in for the hearts and minds of the American political establishment.
[* I do not really like using the word "surge" here. The surge in Iraq was in response to a specific operational situation, Afganistan is a very different and less tractable opertional situation. THis could produce false expectations.]


Some good articles on what to expect.

From General Crystal’s assessment supporting the request for 40,000 additional troops.

The situation in Afghanistan is serious; neither success nor failure can be taken for granted. Although considerable effort and sacrifice have resulted in some progress, many indicators suggest the overall situation is deteriorating. We face not only a resilient and growing insurgency; there is also a crisis of confidence among Afghans -- in both their government and the international community - that undermines our credibility and emboldens the insurgents. Further, a perception that our resolve is uncertain makes Afghans reluctant to align with us against the insurgents.
Success is achievable, but it will not be attained simply by trying harder or "doubling down" on the previous strategy. Additional resources are required, but focusing on force or resource requirements misses the point entirely. The key take away from this assessment is the urgent need for a significant change to our strategy and the way that we think and operate.


snip

This is a different kind of fight. We must conduct classic counterinsurgency operations in an environment that is uniquely complex. Three regional insurgencies have intersected with a dynamic blend of local power struggles in a country damaged by 30 years of conflict. This makes for a situation that defies simple solutions or quick fixes. Success demands a comprehensive counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign.
Our strategy cannot be focused on seizing terrain or destroying insurgent forces; our objective must be the population. In the struggle to gain the support ofthe people, every action we take must enable this effort. The population also represents a powerful actor that can and must be leveraged in this complex system. Gaining their support will require a better understanding of the people's choices and needs. However, progress is hindered by the dual threat of a resilient insurgency and a crisis of confidence in the government and the international coalition. To win their support, we must protect the people from both of these threats.




Strategy Page is gives it’s description of the plan approved by President Obama.

American commanders believe the 30,000 additional U.S. troops, plus increases in Afghan and NATO forces, will enable the Taliban to be crushed within a year. But after that, Afghanistan will require economic and military assistance for at least twenty years, to bring sustained peace to the country. The plan is to turn over security to the central government within five years. Initially, through the middle of next year, there will be more violence. The Taliban and drug gangs will not go gently into the night. They will resist energetically, many choosing to fight to the death.

It continues with a background and assessment.



Michael Yon describes what he thinks will be one of the critical battles around Kandahar. I think this is good assessment of the opertaional problems, what will happen and what needs to be made to happen.

People are confused about the war. The situation is difficult to resolve even for those who are here. For most of us, the conflict remains out of focus, lacking reference of almost any sort.

Thus he begins an overview of the strategic/operational situation in Afghanistan. I doubt you will find a better analysis.

The most we can do is pay attention, study hard, and try to bring something into focus that is always rolling, yawing, and seemingly changing course randomly, in more dimensions than even astronauts must consider. All while gauging dozens of factors, such as Afghan Opinion, Coalition Will, Enemy Will and Capacity, Resources, Regional Actors (and, of course, the Thoroughly Unexpected). Nobody will ever understand all these dynamic factors and track them at once and through time. That’s the bad news.

The good news is that a tiger doesn’t need to completely understand the jungle to survive, navigate, and then dominate. It is not necessary to know every anthropological and historical nuance of the people here. If that were the case, our Coalition of over forty nations would not exist. More important is to realize that they are humans like us. They get hungry, happy, sad, and angry; they make friends and enemies (to the Nth degree); they are neither supermen nor vermin. They’re just people.


Snip

President Obama and NATO will plan to send tens of thousands more troops. The big fight shaping up will likely unfold in the south, in places like Helmand, Kandahar, and to a much lesser extent, Zabul, and also in other eastern provinces. We could use far more troops, and so other places will be left to fester, but the surge and change of course might be enough to turn the war around. We will find out.

Russians say we repeat their mistakes but they are wrong. The Soviets employed true scorched-earth tactics—the same tactics that many armchair commanders at home would like to employ. Every time the Soviets whacked the Afghan hive, more hornets raged out. Soviets bullied their way around places like Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and were fantastically brutal in Afghanistan, using all the fire they could breathe. Their “Rules of Engagement,” if any, were probably more concerned with conserving ammunition. They tortured.

Soviet abuses enflamed the population and combat ranged from north to south—with much occurring in Kandahar Province, the capital of which is Kandahar City. The Soviets fought in places like Bamian, where today Americans can literally go on vacation. The Lithuanian Ambassador to Afghanistan told me he took some holidays in Bamian and loved it. Last year, I drove about a thousand miles from Jalalabad to Kabul to Mazar-i-Sharif and back, and other places, with no problems and no soldiers. Most of the country is not at war. Much of this is a result of our strict “Rules of Engagement” (ROE) which seems to be driving people crazy at home (and many soldiers, too). Many soldiers hate these new ROE, and there is little doubt that we will lose troops due to restrictive ROE. My own thoughts are of little relevance.


He describes the Green zone, the river valleys that have vegetation compared to the vast surrounding desert. This is where the people live and is what must be controlled.

The Green Zone to the right [in his Earth Google shot] is caused by the Arghandab River, just next to Kandahar. The Taliban want Kandahar and are in a good position to get it. The year 2010 likely will mark a true Battle for Kandahar, though it probably will not be punctuated by the sort of pitched battles we saw in places like Mosul and Baghdad. This remains unknown.

Armies from at least three countries have ventured into the Arghandab River Valley: British, followed by Soviets, and more recently Canadians; all were unsuccessful.


Snip

Since the 2001 invasion, U.S. soldiers have come and gone from the Arghandab, but we’ve never had enough soldiers to sit still. More recently, the Canadians made jabs at Arghandab but did not get far. Some people believe the Canadians have been militarily defeated in their battlespace. No US officer has told me that the Canadians have been defeated, and none have denied it. There is no doubt that Canadian troops earned much respect, and that more than 130 paid the ultimate price.

On current course, Canada will have fully retreated by 2011. This is crucial: the enemy realizes that our greatest weakness is Coalition cohesion and they have defeated what was an important partner.

Now it’s mostly down to the U.S. and Afghan forces to saddle Arghandab, or lose Kandahar
and if Kandahar probably the war.

A sobering analysis. On the positive side with enough troops and time a positive engagement strategy winning is possible. On the negative side lack of resources, impatience, or allowing frustration and anger to develop into excessive force, can bring defeat.

Read the whole article. I think it will provide a good filter to to view news reports of military action over the next year or so.
HT: Instapundit


For a lower level look at what the battle will be like see his report on embedding with the 2d Battalion of the British Rifle Regiment which seems to be too small of a unit for it’s mission.


Another key part of the battle will be carrying the war to the enemy which will mostly be Special Operations action. The London Telegraph gives a sanitized summary of what will happen.

It will be a tough year.

See also

Maothought or Who is Winning

Obama Says Bomb ’em
Les Solidat Americain dan Afganistan
East Meets West - President Obama in the Middle East
Mr President - Make a Decision
It's Now Obama's War

All my Afganistan posts.

Monday, September 21, 2009

Book Review: Rome's Greatest Defeat

Two thousand years ago this month the Roman Army in Lower Germany, three legions strong with auxiliaries, was was wiped out, almost to a man. The battle of the Teutoburg Forest is one of Rome’s largest and most famous defeats. Until recently very little was known about the battle, even it’s exact location, except for a few second hand reports from Roman authors. Recently a number of archeological discoveries have shed light on this battle.




Rome’s Greatest Defeat: Massacre in the Teutoburg Forest
Adrian Murdoch
Sutton Publishing, 2006

Murdoch's Bread and Circuses Blog
The Blog's Teutoburg Posts

Imperium Konflict Mythos Official 2000th Anniversary site.
Kalkriese Museum





Adrian Murdoch describes the tangle of political, cultural and military affairs that led to this battle and the consequences. The account of the battle is just a chapter but with a judicious reading of the ancient sources and modern research he presents a very common sense account of the events leading up to the battle , the battle, and it‘s consequences.

Lower Germany was in the process of being integrated into the Empire. Murdoch describes this process, involving a forced change in the culture politics and economy of the province. It was always complicated with winners and losers at many levels of socity and sometimes resulting in a revolt, usually defeated with much bloodshed. He tells the story of Sextus Quinctilius Varus a proven governor, able administrator, and competent general who was apparently under orders to speed up the process; and Arminius a German noble, an officer in the Roman army, and secretly a leader of the anti-Roman faction. Arminius managed to set up an alliance of several tribes, despite opposition in his own and the other tribes, while convincing Varus of his loyalty and preparing a trap for the Roman Army. There was a report of a revolt and Varus and the Army set off to deal with it and marched into the carefully laid trap, for three days they fight to escape and are finally annihilated at the recently discovered battle field at Kalkriese. The defeat rocks the Roman world, and the resulting Roman punitive expedition wrecks the hostile tribes for generations. The Romans make no effort reestablish a permanent presence on the east side of the Rhine. The impact of the failure to Romanize German culture has been debated for centuries. Much later Arminius becomes a hero in the development of German nationalism. Arminius gets the rare distinction of being a general who defeated the Romans: but is not killed by Rome or dies in their captivity.

Defeated generals are always easy targets for blame, Murdoch shows that despite the accusations of incompetence heaped on Varus, he was in fact a competent governor and general, selected for both ability and loyalty the Emperor. He had extensive experience as governor of the tumultus province of Syria. Many of the criticisms of his action are based on 20/20 hindsight but his actions were quite reasonable in the circumstances.

Arminius had learned soldiering from the Romans, but a was also master of the German tribal politics. There were many in the tribes, including members of his own family, who favored cooperation with Romans, ether because they saw an advantage or it was the lesser of two evils. Arminius managed to convince enough of the leadership in the tribes to join him. Since Arminius was a central contact for Roman contact with the Germans he controlled much of the information going to Varus. Murdoch thinks that Varus dismissed the reports that got to him as attempts to draw him into the internal politics of the tribes, which he declined.

Murdoch’s encyclopedic knowledge of the classical world, his easy writing style and common sense analysis provide a clear explanation of the events that is assessable al l readers. This is by far the best of the recent books on this battle that have been published in English. Strongly Recommended.

See Also

Book Review: The Battle That Stopped Rome by Peter Wells
Book Review: Quest for The Lost Legions by Tony Benn

The Advance Guard Fiction

Related
Book Review: Eagle in the Snow
Book Review: The Fall of the Roman Empire




Analysis and opinion.

What happened, this is my assessment.



Possible Route of Roamn Army 9 AD Teutoburg Forest

One thing is certain is that Varus did not get his route from Google Maps, but it is a best case close approximation and gives an idea of what was involved. [See comment from Delta V] He was moving to put down a revolt was in what is now the northern Netherlands or extreme northwest Germany. It is sixty kilometers from Minden to Kalkriese and another ten to Bramsche. 100 kilometers more to the legionary fortress at Haltern or 150 kilometers to the base at Xanten on the Rhine, He would have been expecting to march for about six hours 20 to 24 kilomters a day with column of about 12,000 solidiers, at least the same number of camp followers and 5000 horses or oxen. Quite possibly the advance guard would be marking the evenings camp as the rear guard was exiting last nights camp. Given the large amount of equipment they carried they would have at most five days of food.

This is the shortest route with the least hills, we forget how important that was when everything moved by sore muscles and aching backs. The route is mostly open farmland making it possible for the Army to get at least some of it’s food locally. Tactically it is reasonable ground, with only one real choke point, the narrows at Kalkriese. The other possible routes were longer, had less farm land and more obstacles. I think that the first leg of his march was to the area of modern Bramcshe, where the army would have to spend a day on river crossing. From there he could send his excess baggage back to Haltern or Xanten with a small escort and the tactical part of the Army would move to suppress the revolt. He would have made a prior announcement that he will be buying food at Bramcshe for the next leg of the march. All this assumes he believed he was marching through friendly territory.

The tactical system of the Roman army was a combination of heavy and light infantry supported by cavalry. The legion provided the heavy infantry. The legion can be compared to a steam roller. Nothing could stand in front of it. But it was slow and awkward to move, subject to flank attacks and required an enemy who was willing or forced to stand in front of it. Rough terrain could break it’s formation reducing it’s effectiveness. If the enemy had fortifications the legions engineers would overcome them with time. The other half of the team was the light infantry. This was either Roman auxiliary cohorts or forces provided by allies. They would scout, protect the flanks, clear enemy scouts, and with luck push the enemy under the steam roller. The light infantry would guard the legions march into hostile territory where the legions would attack a political, cultural or economic location that the enemy must defend, i.e. stand in front of the "steam roller" and hope to win. The important thing is that the legions of this period could not act alone they needed their light infantry support. The light infantry could operate alone but they would seldom be able to defeat an enemy unless they out numbered them or they had some unusual advantage. It was the team effort that make the Roman armies formidable. A common statistic in Roman history is the light and heavy forces were approximately equal strength. Varus’s Army did not have enough auxiliaries to provide the light infantry part of the team. The other auxiliary cohorts were garrisoning forts throughout the province. Varus was depending on his German allies to provide the light infantry.



In August Varus received word of the revolt. He started his preparations and called back his scattered garrisons to Minden, which is a good concentration point and possibly his headquarters. I think, since the route was known he had engineers out improving the road and had his German allies secure the route and occupy critical points such as the narrows at Kalkriese (with fortifications?). The word was sent out where he would be buying food along the route. The Allied tribes were called to come join him, either at Minden or Bramsche. The warnings he had received probably seemed to be part of the background noise that happens in any occupied province, but nothing so significant as to arouse suspicion, or make him distrust Arminius.

The Army moved out. I would think they would have made twenty to twenty four kilometers, and built a camp. The next day the advance guard had moved another twenty to twenty four kilometers and was at or close to it’s intended camp for the night when the attacks started. The front of the Army started to set up a camp and the rest closed in on it. There would have been hundreds of little attacks, each not causing much damage but the total would add up. The ground was still open enough that the Romans could move off the road and clear flanks. The baggage trains were probably hurt worse than the troops. This would be a nightmare for Varus and the senior commanders, the Army was spread out along the road there was little they could do to influence the battle. It was a centurions and soldiers battle, if the army was not well disciplined and trained it might not have survived the first day.

In the camp they got ready for the next day. The Army was in trouble but it was not defeated. Wagons and excess baggage were burned. This shortened the length of the column and make it eaiser to bypass obstacles. To make matters worse the fierce autumn German thunder storms started soaking every thing and making the roads much less usable. The Army rested as much as it could, reorganized and came out fighting. They moved a lot slower because they were in a tactical formtion partly off the road, the Germans destroyed advance work of the engineers, the rain, and fighting off constant attacks. By nightfall they would have been lucky to have advanced ten kilometers. they established a new but a vary hasty and improvised camp. The Army knew it was not going to get home. Varus and his top aides committed suicide, the cavalry tried to ride out, some tried to surrender. In the morning the Army moved out in a forlorn hope on broken ground and came to the ambush at Kalkriese. Most of the army perished here. Only a handful got back to Roman territory.


Once Arminius united the tribes and attacked the Army, the Army was lost, every thing else was details. The Army was, at best, seven to ten days march on half rations from nearest fort. The closest possible relief force was at Mainz a months march away. The tactical system was broken, without light infantry the legions would be would be worn down in a series of small actions. They were north of the Wiehengebrige ridge and their bases were on the south side. Forcing any of the gaps in the ridge would require light infantry. A wall had been constructed at Kalkrese, the engineers could defeat it with time, but a retreating army on half rations does not have time. A Gaius Julius Caesar might have brought that army home, but Sextus Quinctilius Varus was simply a competent general in a situation where genius might not have been enough.

The defeat was more political than military. The credit is Arminius’s as a political leader for uniting tribes and the defeat is Varus’s as governor for failing to prevent it.


Note: The exact size of the Army and how much road space it took, can’t be determined from the existing data. I made a number of assumptions, but small changes make big changes in the result. The Roman legions were probably between 2000 and 4000 men present for duty, I think closer to 3000. The auxiliaries were probably another 3000 men. The number of camp followers was usual about the same as the number of soldiers. They other big factor is how wide was the road. I am assuming it was wide enough to march four abreast, which would also be wide enough for a wagon. There would be an interval (size?) between units, necessary to keep the army from bunching up an spreading out on hills and turns. While the Romans were masters at it, moving an Army this size was difficult to manage under the best of circumstances.
For those who want to crunch their own numbers.

Field Manual 21-18 - Procedures and Techniques of Foot Marches

The March

Wednesday, August 24, 2005

Escalate in Iraq??

Roger Payne of the University of Louisville posted on his blog and at The Duck of Minerva a suggestion the left could defeat the Presidents Iraq policy by pointing that there out there are complaints, especially from the military, that Bush did not escalate the war enough. The assumption being that a major portion of the Presidents support for the war would “jump ship” in protest of a failed policy.

I posted these comments (below) in the comment sections of those blogs.



Rodger

If I may, I think there are several points that you missed.

Your suggestion, as I gather it is that instead of the two option, “stay the course” or "pull out NOW” there is a third option of escalation, and that criticism of the Presidents failure to escalate sufficiently, will produce a backlash that would turn into net votes for the Left in 2008.

First the “Jacksonians” no matter how dissatisfied they may be with a non-candidate President Bush, they will be aware that a vote for the left would be trading bad for worse. If they perceive that this suggestion comes from the left they discount it. For this to work they need an alternative place to go, and the left won’t be it.

Bringing up Secretary Rumsfled’s ignoring the advice of General Shinseki advice won’t carry much weight. He had already lost much respect prior to Jan 2001 as an effective Chief of Staff. Of course he was right, but I got the same conclusion eyeballing the news papers pre-war, most any competent military analyst would. But a gamble was taken, it succedded in the immiedate operations. A complaint that the course of action should have been more prudent is not going to change votes.

It is pretty much the same for subsequent force levels. They can be critizied for being imprudently low, but except for the two battles at Fullajah it would be hard to make a case that does not sound like Monday moring quarter backing.

If the question of failing to escalate is rendered irrelevant by events, it will be a major PR victory for the President. It appears (despite news stories on worst case contingency planning) the plan is to have major force reductions by the 2006 elections. It seem probable that there will be at least noticeable reductions by the 2006 election and more by 2008. This will make calling for escalation seem foolish.

Your point is about the political tactics that should be adopted by the left IN THE US. Not about what is appropriate to the military situation.

In Viet Nam there was a real third choice, there were enemy locations, other wise off limits, which could have been attacked with militarily beneficial results. (The actual value I am sure will be a debated topic for decades.)

In Iraq at the current time an increase in troop levels would be more prudent but it would be hard to say it was big enough change in operations to be an escalation. The Iraq war is a slug it phase and there are no “off limit” targets that have the potential to change the military situation. The third choice you mention is only a rhetorical device in the current situation; there is enough alternative media to point this out. I doubt it would convince the “Jacksonians” you want to jump ship.



The country needs an effective alternative party for a two party system to work. Forget Bush, forget Iraq, and develop an effective counter vision and program for 2008. If things blow up in Iraq the left will be in a position to take advantage of it. If things go well in Iraq, opposing a policy that turned out successful will not be the last impression of the left in the popular memory.
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