War Termination

War is the continuation politics (or policy) by other means
Major General Carl von Clausewitz

The mission of the Army is to close with and destroy the enemy by means of fire and maneuver.
US Army

Should Deterrence Fail: War Termination in Campaign Planning
Lieutenant Colonel James W Reed
Parameters 1993


Wars end. Preferably they end on favorable terms and accomplish the ends for which they were fought. But how do we get there? This 1993 article from Parameters, the Journal of the U. S. Army War Collage, by James W Reed addresses the question of war termination especially from the point of view of the operational commander. While the operational commander is primarily fighting the battle his actions should be pointed not just to the battlefield defeat of the enemy forces, but also seeing that the enemy’s defeat helps accomplish the political goals of the war.

First Reed asks if there is a military role in conflict termination. His general comments are that since war is a continuation of policy by other means the military should plan their operations not simply to defeat the enemy but to end the war with the policy accomplished. Military action can support diplomatic action by creating an incentive for the enemy to accept or negotiate terms before a defeat. The way in which the enemy was defeated can have bearing on post war dealings with the former enemy or his successors. He also sees the transition from war to peace as not simply an end to the shooting but a requirement to support reestablishment of civil government, take care of refugees, repair war damage etc which would require coordination with outside agencies, national and international, that are experts in these items.


Next he looks at the state of the war termination in the Defense Departments doctrinal literature. He finds the issue is addressed as a general statement as something that should be done. But there is virtually no discussion of how it should be done. (I found that these subjects were addressed supplemental Student Texts in service schools with reproduced articles by distinguished scholars and discussion seminars, but never anything giving an “Official US Army” position on a political subject.)

He sees the major cause for this is the separation in western thought between the military and civilian (political) spheres. War termination is tied with the political goals, and the military is reluctant to intrude on political questions. Political leaders often see their role as beginning at the peace conference table and thus are not overly interested in the military operational practice. He addresses briefly in the footnotes the fact that left and right leaning politicians are likely to have very different ideas on war goals, making any discussion by the military a virtual minefield.

Most of the discussion is directed toward situations where the enemy power would continue to exist after the war, not régime change policies. But the importance he places on the transition from war to peace implies that if there is a régime change policy, coordination between the operational military commander and civilian agencies is even more important than usual. The military must assume roles no longer performed by the enemy government. Writing from a US perspective he does not address how the commander in a losing situation might use his forces to mitigate or frustrate the enemies accomplishment of his goals despite military victory.

He has a long example form the Korean War where US objectives changed several times and how the military interacted with political leadership, and several other lesser examples.

Analysis:

He recommends several guidelines for campaign planners.

1. Identify a distinct war termination phase in the campaign planning process

2. Emphasize a regressive (i.e. backward-planning) approach to campaign development

3. Define the operational conditions to be produced during the terminal phase of the campaign in explicit, unambiguous terms.

These first three recommendations are really the “backward planning process” taught in any management class or workshop. In a more traditional military terms the first principle of war is the Objective know what you are supposed to and focus on it. In war termination planning the political leadership needs to know and state clearly what it wants to accomplish, the operational commander must plan his operations so that the battlefield defeat of the enemy accomplishes these objectives.

4. Consider how efforts to eliminate or degrade your opponent's command and control may affect, positively or negatively, your efforts to achieve particular objectives

This comment is unusual. Normally destroying the enemies’ ability to command and control is a very desirable goal. But the point is well taken, in some situations leaving the enemy the ability to issue a cease fire or surrender order could be desirable. A cease fire/surrender order would carry more weight when issued by ones own superiors especially to units that are not yet in tactical difficulty. In my reading, at the end of a campaign it is common for units not to get cease fire/surrender orders in time, sometimes with very tragic consequences..

5. Consider the manner in which the tempo of the terminal phase of an operational campaign affects the ability to achieve established policy objectives

Early in a war the operational commander is likely to be concerned with the survival of his force and getting into a decisive position and does not have to worry about war termination except to prevent it from happening on the enemies terms. But at the end of the war he has to be concerned with obtaining the terrain needed for political reasons, capture of war criminals, restoration of government and many other things besides simply defeating the enemy. While the overall enemy may be defeated, individual enemy units may retain considerable capability; he needs to be sure that these cannot frustrate political goals. This is often a very fast moving situation; there may not be time to consult as to what needs to be done.

6. View war termination not as the end of hostilities but as the transition to a new post-conflict phase characterized by both civil and military problems.

Even if there is a clean end of the fighting, there is much that needs to be done to restore effective public services and a normal society. The nature of military operations breaks down normal civil life especially law enforcement. Often, at first the military is the only thing present that can start the recovery process. At the very least the military is the only force present that can provide law enforcement services. While the military role should diminish it is most usually impossible to a have an on/off change.


The quotes that begin this post bring up a dilemma; the proper role of the military "Closing with and destroying" does not address the whole problem "a continuation of politics (or policy) ." Quite properly the military should be subordinate to civilian leadership.

The military services are properly unwilling to intrude on the role of the civilian leadership. The elected/appointed civilian leadership comes to office, often for reasons that have nothing to do with military knowledge, and sometimes, without using too much hyperbole, with no more a background than watching “The Sands of Iwo Jima” and/or “Apocalypse Now” on the late show. Usually they bring in some academic experts for advice and they have the advice of the career diplomats for assistance, but there will always be an opportunity for misunderstanding and miscommunication.

Because the military should not intrude on what are properly civilian functions, it is incumbent on the civilian leadership to initiate process of translating the national goals in to military requirements. Keeping within the proper bounds of a proper civilian/military relationship, the operational commander has to determine what his superiors want to accomplish and how and discuss with them the implications and opportunities. If he gets a clear understanding of what is desired he will often have the flexibility to shape his operations to be of greater assistance to the national goals than simply destroying the enemy.

This article is especially interesting in view of recent actions by the US. The Afghanistan and Iraq invasions, the insurgency in Iraq, and possible action against Iran would make interesting case studies. In the first two at least it seems that the political leadership in the Defense Department had definite ideas on the role of field commanders relative to post war operations – this is not the business of the field commander and the only instructions were that others would take it over after the fighting. - Case studies in how not to do it.

Military Culture Wars

Review: Occupations, Cultures, and Leadership in the Army and Air Force
George R. Mastroianni
Parameters, Winter 2005-06, pp. 76-90


The Fall Winter issue of Parameters, the journal of the US Army War Collage has a very interesting article by Dr. George R. Mastroianni on the cultural differences between the military services. He is well qualified for this as he is a Professor in the Department of Behavioral Sciences and Leadership at the Air Force War Collage and a Lieutenant Colonel in the US Army Reserve.

I spent several years as a civilian employee of a jointly manned headquarters, the differences between the services cultures are real, usually the cause of much humor, but also a potential problem in our ability to conduct war and preserve the peace.

The article's focus is on the differences between the Army and the Air Force officer corps, which is where he has his personal experience. He also limits his study to combat arms officers for the Army and pilots for the Air Force as these groups set the standard for their respective services.

He starts out with the observation that large organizations can be characterized by their members intuitional and/or occupational commitment. Are the members of the organization committed to the organization and its ideals or to a occupation that they can take to another organization depending on their self interest. He makes the assertion that, while officers in both services have share these commitments, Army officers have a stronger intuitional commitment that the Air Force officers. Partly this is because pilots have a portable skill, they can leave the service and be airline pilots, infantry officers can leave the service and be anything but infantry officers.

The differences that different occupations have on the cultures is also a factor, the way you process information as pilot flying at supersonic speeds is different than the way you would process information in a fox hole. By the time these officers reach mid and high level positions these patterns of thinking come with them and effect their actions and decisions.

A major difference between the two services is the their approach to leadership and the relationship between commissioned officers and non-commissioned officers. The humor is that the air force would say their enlisted men strap a weapons system on the back of their officers and send them into combat, whereas in the Army the officers send their enlisted men into combat. The Army would say that an Air Force pilot is really the commander of a flying tank and is a grossly overpaid staff sergeant. Both these observations are extreme overstatements. But the differences are real. An army officers first job is as a platoon leader; his platoon has a platoon sergeant, who has the job of teaching the lieutenant how to be a combat officer. While the Air Force prizes its enlisted mechanics who keep the planes flying a mechanic is not going to teach the new Air Force officer how to be a pilot. I gather that in many Air Force organizations the pilots and mechanics are in different sub-organizations. The Air Force officer respects the NCO's specialists with whom they have few interactions, the Army officer dealt with the senior NCO as a collaborator in the day to day work of his unit. The result is that an Air force Officer will spend his first formative years with a group of people who have similar backgrounds, education, training and aspirations. The Army officer spends his first formative years with other combat officers but also with people who have different backgrounds, education, training, and aspirations. At later points in their service this effects their professional relations with persons outside their service, outside the military and government. He suggests that Air Force officers can are more effective in dealing with scientific/technical people. Army officers generally have experience and training that allows them to work better with a broader set of situations and people.

When I was working in joint headquarters I saw this in play, the officers of both services were usually Captains or higher. This was typically the first assignment where an Air Force officer was in a leadership position. The Army Officer had been the platoon leader and maybe the company commander of units ranging from 20 to 150 soldiers. The Air Force officer had been held positions where his technological knowledge was essential to the organization, the army officer was a generalist who called on technical experts. This would cause problems as higher ranked Army officers had assumed that a Air Force Captain should already be an experienced leader and higher ranked Air Force officers assumed a Army Captain should have much deeper technical skills.

An observation.

The President’s military experience was as an interceptor pilot. The Secretary of Defense was a Navy reserve anti-submarine pilot. They appointed a strategic Air Force pilot as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Other appointments tended to follow a similar pattern. The Secretary of Defense is supporting technology based transformations. The inability of the Army professional leadership and the Secretary of Defense to understand each other are legendary. We are in ground war. The Air Force flies a sortie, destroys the target and returns to base. The Army captures a place and holds it against all comers. The Rumsfeld/Shineski controversy can be described as one seeing a sortie to replace Saddam and go home - the other seeing a mission capture a place (Iraq,) control it, and hold it. While not explaining everything or even most things, the story of events leading up to the war and it’s conduct becomes much clearer when these differences are understood.


There is much more in this article than I reviewed, I strongly recommend this article.