Katrina - National Guard Assitance

As the events of Hurricane Katrina unfolded I noticed several things that seemed unusual to me. First is that National Guard troops seemed to be leaving their home states with out being federalized. This was first that National Guard from several states were staging in Tennessee to support operations in Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana. After Katrina made landfall the troops going to support were National Guard units from across the country. There was no news story of the National Guard being federalized. When the National Guard went into New Orleans it was under the command of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, which one would normally assume is not an operational command position. My expectation was that the state National Guard would be federalized and reinforced with large numbers of Active Duty Federal troops. The Federal troops were mostly Coast Guard and Navy that came to the coast and units that were stationed in the area.

The National Guard is both a Militia of the State under the Constitution’s Milita clauses, and a Reserve of the Army under the power of Congress to raise an Army. This means that the National Guard can be called to state active duty as a militia of the state by the governor, called to federal active duty as the militia of the United States with the consent of the governor or ordered to active duty by the President as a reserve of the Army. If the National Guard was to leave it’s home state in an active status I thought it would have to be federalized. (Note: I discuss the history of the militia from a different angle here but the pertinent background is there.)

Thanks to Google I did a little research.

In the 1990’s the states and Congress agreed to the the Emergency Management Assistance Compact EMAC to provide a vehicle for states to assist each other in an emergency. (Pre-Katrina overview.) This compact was made on the iniative of several state governors under the authority of Section 10 Article I on the US Constitution, since compacts are passed as laws of the states that agree to them and by Congress they have the force of law at both state and federal levels. The law of the states that agree to the compact is that the governor will request National Guard support in an emergency from other states that are members of the compact, which by their own law must provide it. The troops remain on state active duty. The requesting state is responsible for funding (almost certain to be reimbursed by the federal government.) The loaned National Guard units have the same status as the requesting states National Guard, no Posse Comitatus Act and no federal supremacy doctrine. The largest previous use of National Guard under the compact was 800 Guardsman, mostly specialized units during last year’s hurricanes in Florida.

The Compact covers more than the National Guard. It can authorize all kinds of non-military assistance. This is important because what is often needed is not the military but professionals in the specialized fields of local government. News reports tell of support in police, fire, public health, medical areas and I'm sure many others. FEMA and other Federal agencies apparently have their disaster assistance programs coordinated with EMAC Compact.

This compact has been governing emergency assistance for ten years, and seems to have worked well for emergencies that required much less support. The thing that puts the Compact into operation is the request from the governor of the effected state. Mississippi and Alabma requested assistance 24 hours before the Katrina arrived. It is not clear from the news reports I have read when the Louisiana request was made, some reports suggest up to 48 hours after the levee broke. The news reports show that once the assistance was on the ground it worked well. There were a some lesser problems with implementation due to the size of the call up and key people at all levels not understanding their roles under EMAC. It appears there is a need for some better planning for large emergencies. There also needs to be a way to require key officials to be briefed and understand their roles in an emergency before it happens.



I think this is a good approach to emergency relief. It is a means to provide assistance to a state, which can be tailored to need, and without the complications of dual federal and state jurisdiction. It is completely in keeping with the Federal nature of the Republic, assistance can be provided with out stretching the Constitution. It should be improved not scrapped.

For more information do Google searches on EMAC National Guard, EMAC FEMA, EMAC Katrina, or EMAC with whatever other term you are interested in. eMac by itself will tell you all about Apple Computers.


NOTE: The Posse Comitatus Act governs and restricts the use of federal troops in law enforcement roles. The exception to the Posse Comitatus Act I and II that allows the President to put federal troops in a law enforcement role also requires a request from the state governor. Many other federal emergency assistance programs also need a request for the state governor to be implemented.

Nine Eleven -- A Memorial

A couple weeks after 9/11 I was in the hospital waiting room. The television was droning something that someone else was watching; when Robin Williams came on with one of those short commemorations to the heroes of 9/11. I glanced at the screen and saw . . .

. . . Major Rescorla was the squadron executive officer of our reserve unit.

Something of a legend, he had served in three armies,
with a Silver Star, Bronze Stars with “V”s, Purple Hearts,
and too much else to count. At first glance a snake eater,
but when you talked to him you realized the tough
exterior hid a deep intellect and compassion.

Loud, larger than life, and full of fun,
he could take the joke as well as give it out.
As he was walking back to our area one day the
Sergeants decided to from a “chain.” They walked
past him with just enough interval that he had
to return thirty some hand salutes one at a time.
He was laughing out loud by the end of the chain.

As XO, he was the chief of staff, a staff that didn’t
call attention to itself, but plans worked and soldiers
were supported. And always, more than most any officer
I ever met, he would always make the extra effort
to take care of his soldiers. To the point of making
a trip to Division HQ to get a privates records
straightened out.

When we had Squadron runs he would finish close behind
the nineteen year olds, and without missing a step turn
around go to the rear, set a pace and hustle up the stragglers.

He had the stereotypical command voice of a British
Regimental Sergeant Major. A little less effective
when we realized his bark was worse than his bite.
One summer camp the officers were put in the Hospital
area for quarters. The lieutenants and captains in
one wing and the Major and Colonel in the next, they
wanted some quiet. However it turned out the next wing
over housed the enlisted soldiers of the hospital.
And inclined to spend all night partying on the lawn
between the wings. Until one night about 0100 hours
Major Rescorla stood on the porch in his skivvies
and with that command voice put them to bed.

He was promoted and took command of another
squadron and then moved to New York for
his civilian job.


When the planes hit, the evacuation plan was sound
and rehearsed. He took 2500 people out of the building
on the sound of that voice. When informed some his
people were still in the building he went back
to get them. Last seen going up.

. . . And as Robin went off and the TV returned to the regularly scheduled commercials I was thinking. . .

“Husslin’ up stragglers, couldn’t do any thing else!”

Richard C Rescorla, Colonel, Infantry, USAR, Retired.
Requiem aeternam dona eis, Domine, et lux perpetua luceat eis.

Katrina - Calling for Heads on a Platter

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Well it has started. Katrina’s level IV winds (actually approaching level V) smashed into the Gulf Coast with hurricane defenses designed for level III storms. So before all the survivors are rescued and the damage assessed people are demanding the heads of those supposedly responsible (that is the heads of their usual opponents) be delivered on a platter.

Actually, while there was more damage than usual because of the stronger than normal hurricane, the relief actions came on rather quickly, except for New Orleans after the levee broke. The flood caused by the levees knocked out major transportation arteries into New Orleans, damaged the emergency communication systems, and destroyed pre-stocked supplies and equipment that the relief agencies would use to recover. It took three or so days to do what would have been done in hours.

Depending on affiliation, there are those who are calling for the heads at the federal level currently controlled by the Republicans, or heads at the state and city levels currently controlled by the Democrats. And who knows maybe some of them did do something malfeasant, but should we call for heads before we really know what failed and why?

New Orleans’ levees were built over the last hundred and fifty or so years. Of course the biggest problem is that the levees were built to withstand a level III storm. Every year at least one level III hurricane hits the US coast. It is easy to convince people that spending money on a threat that happens someplace every year. But level IV and V hurricanes are much more infrequent. My engineer friends point out a rule of thumb that protecting the last 10% of any thing costs at least as much as the first 90%. So when you explain the cost of upgrading the hurricane defenses to level IV, you are talking about an extremely expensive project. In any given city on the coast the probability of a level VI hurricane in the life time of the current inhabitants is minimal. It will happen someplace but it is easy rationalize away the chance that it will happen here. Not that any one is really against upgrading per se, there are just so many other good projects competing for limited funds. Politicians of all stripes prefer projects with a visible payout to their constituencies in a time frame where the voters will connect the benefits with the politician. The price tag, waiting for many years in Congress to fund, to develop the plan to upgrade the New Orleans levees to level IV is eight billion dollars. Every one will have projects that produce more immediate and visible results, so it wasn’t funded.


There certainly needs to be a major review of what happened, what went wrong, and what to do about it. It is possible that it will turn out that current leaders actually did do something malfeasant, but we should wait until the evidence is in. But we should not call for heads of the current leadership to make us feel better, get some political advantage, or deflect ones own responsibilities. The real cause is that the practical consensus of the whole political system was that upgrading the levees would cost more than anyone was willing to spend.

So get the platters and bring on the heads.

Or better yet note the politicians, of both parties, who are calling for heads and on election day hand them their own heads.

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